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VICTIMIZATION: A LEGALIST ANALYSIS OF




This essay aims to develop and define a concept, Victimization, and to
argue that it lies at the logical core of a varied group of legal excuses and
pleas in avoidance. The thesis will be developed primarily in connection with
various legal tests for coercion (or duress)1 in both civil and criminal law.
t U.C.L.A., B.A. (1947); U.C.L.A., Ph.D, (1949); Professor of Philosophy, University
of California, Santa Barbara.
The basic research for this article was done in a semester when the author was Frances
Lewis Scholar in Residence at the School of Law, Washington and Lee University. The generous
invitation of the Center not only made possible the time to do this work, and provided
outstanding facilities in support of it, but also introduced me into a stimulating intellectual and
collegial setting. I wish to express my very great appreciation for all these things.
L The terms "coercion" and "duress" are used interchangeably throughout this article.
This is consistent with modern usage. See U.S. v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 569 n.3 (9th Cir.
1977) ("'coercion' and 'duress' are used interchangeably throughout the literature on the
subject"). The old distinction-in which the term "coercion," as distinguished from "duress,"
had specific reference to a wife's act in the presence of her husband-is acknowledged by most
commentators to be largely defunct in modern law. See J. SMITH & B. HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW
170 (3d ed. 1973) (coercion of wife is "an unnecessary anomaly"); G. WVLLuL4s, TExTBooK ON
CRIMINAL LAW 568 (1978) (coercion of wife "not sufficiently distinct to give it much practica-
bility"). Smith and Hogan say that R. v. Pierce, 5 J. Cr. L. 124 (1941), is the only (English)
reported case on the point. See J. SMnrI & B. HOGAN, supra, at 169. Apparently, however, the
well-known case of R. v. Bourne, 36 Cr. App. R. 125 (1952), was originally argued on the
basis of coercion, although the Court of Criminal Appeals took it up as a plea of duress. See
J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRImINAL LAW 437 (2d ed. 1960) (stating that coercion of
wife is "little more than the vestige of the medieval conception of marriage"); W. LAFAVF &
A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 380-81 (1972) (strong trend to abolish rule for coercion
of wife, although "a dwindling number of states probably still adhere to the old doctrine"); R.
PERKINS, CRINNAL LAW 918 (2d ed. 1969) ("the ancient rule [is] tending to disappear");
Edwards, Duress and Aiding and Abetting, 69 LAW Q. REv. 226 (1953) (explaining duress
defense for wife). Unlike most commentators, Edwards argued for retention of the special
defense of coercion of a wife. Edwards, Compulsion, Coercion, and Criminal Responsibility,
14 MOD. L. REv. 297, 312-13 (1951). However, Edwards' argument that there still remains a
considerable proportion of married women who regard their husbands as their lord and master,
to disobey whose commands would be unthinkable, reveals more about the distance we have
come since 1951 in sex and marital relations than it does about the likely development of the
law on this matter. See id. Edwards, along with some other writers, uses the term "compulsion"
as equivalent to duress. See, e.g., R. PERKINS, supra, at 951. The term "compulsion" is not
used herein for two reasons: (1) It is unnecessary and less commonly used; and (2) it can serve
a useful role ab S, term reserved specifically for the use of sheer physical force to directly cause
another person's body motions, i.e., grasping a person's wrist and physically forcing, that is,
compelling, the hand to write a signature or to press a switch.
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The general concept of Victimization also underlies concepts such as "undue
influence," '2 and it is directly relevant to certain prison-escape defenses,3 as
well as types of excuse/avoidance concepts centering on deception and
misrepresentation .
4
In a plea of Victimization as a basis of excuse or avoidance,' the
commission of a certain act as legally defined is admitted, but avoidance of,
or excuse from, ordinary legal burdens consequent on that act6 is claimed
on the ground of the further special circumstances of Victimization. These
further circumstances consist, in brief, in someone else's having wrongfully
so arranged matters as to lead the otherwise innocent Victim to choose
reasonably to commit the act in question.
The Victimization concept may be characterized as a "legalist" one. It
is so in several respects: (1) The key terms of the definition that will emerge
out of the analyses are legal ones, not psychological, moral, or otherwise
2. See infra text accompanying notes 176-86.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 159-71.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 138-58 & 191.
5. The logical point at issue is best expressed by the term "avoidance," i.e., one avoids
certain otherwise normal legal effects of the act. One can speak of coercion as an "excuse,"
which it is when used as a defense to a criminal charge, i.e., coercion as an excuse for the act.
But when used as a basis for, for example, avoiding payment under a contract, "coercion" is
not, properly speaking, an "excuse," unless we stretch the meaning of "excuse" beyond its
normal legal meaning; in the everyday idiom we might say it is not an excuse for signing the
contract but instead is a request to be excused from paying. Since no handy legal noun form
for "avoid" analogous to an "excuse" exists, I have adopted the convention of speaking of
"coercion" (and later in this paper, speaking of Victimization) as "an excuse/avoidance
concept," and in variant contexts as the "excuse/avoidance force" or as "excuse/avoidance"
pleas.
6. The significance and legitimacy of this usage will be discussed in more fundamental
terms in section IV of this article. But since the analyses that follow are intended to develop,
among other things, the foundation for relying on this usage, and since the analyses themselves
do not depend upon this usage, it should suffice merely to explain the usage and to note that
it is verbally plausible. Thus, Black's Law Dictionary defines "avoidance" as: "The allegation
or statement of new matter in opposition to a former pleading, which, admitting the facts
alleged is such former pleading, shows cause why they should not have their ordinary legal
effect." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 125 (5th ed. 1979). Defining the phrase "confession and
avoidance," Black's Law Dictionary states: "A plea...which avows and confesses the truth of
the averments of fact in the complaint or declaration, either expressly or by implication, but
then proceeds to allege new matter which tends to deprive the facts admitted of their ordinary
legal effect, or to obviate, neutralize or avoid them." (emphasis in original). Id. at 269.
The terms "avoid" and "excuse" as used in this article are intended to convey the force
and meaning of those clauses in the above definitions that follow the phrasing as to "new
matter"; but the "confession" element is intended to be more specific in this article than it is
in the dictionary definition. In the phrase "avoidance or excuse" as used herein, one who offers
the excuse is, specifically, one who admits having done a certain act as defined by law, and
who asks to avoid the ordinary legal effects of that act. Thus, a person may do an act that fits
the definition of first degree murder, but ask to be excused from conviction and punishment
because of insanity; or a person may sign a contract under conditions that fulfill all the legal
requirements for executing a contract, but ask to avoid (be excused from) performance on the
ground that the signing was done under economic coercion.
[Vol. 42:65
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extra-legal; (2) the role of the concept is determinable entirely within the
framework of legal concepts; and, finally, (3) a sufficient justification of the
excusing/avoiding force of the concept can be provided solely on the basis
of legal principle. In developing this concept of Victimization, the object is
not to substitute it in legal practice for the extant pleas. Instead, the object
is to provide insight, theoretical understanding, and an analytical tool in the
handling of traditional legal doctrine.
The first major phase of the argument7 begins with an analysis of the
concept of coercion as it appears in the criminal law and, more specifically,
in the defense to a criminal charge. Subsequently, other uses of "coercion"
in both the criminal and civil law will be examined. The second major phase
of the argument8 consists of an explicit formulation of the general concept
of Victimization, and a discussion of its meaning as well as its applicability
to excuse/avoidance pleas other than coercion. Finally, there is a brief
explanation of why Victimization justifies excuse or avoidance.
II. TI RATIONALE FOR COERCION CLAims IN EXCUSE OR AVOIDANCE
A. Coercion as Defense to a Criminal Charge
The criminal defense of coercion is plainly a main model on which legal
reasoning about coercion generally has been based. By the 19th and 20th
centuries the common law regarding coercion as a defense to a criminal
charge was well established.9 The legal test has undergone no fundamental
7. See infra section II.
8. See infra section III.
9. The elements of the test for the common law coercion defense are as follows (the
citations and comments supporting the italicized terms are keyed to the letters in parentheses):
(a) The otherwise innocent defendant (b) must have had a well-grounded belief (c) in a threat
of imminent (d) death or serious injury (e) from which there was no escape except through
compliance with the demands of the threatener; (f) if the defendant did comply and in so doing
committed the alleged criminal act, the defendant is to be excused by being found Not Guilty
(g) except where the alleged criminal act is murder.
(a) The Model Penal Code, § 2.09(2), provides that the defense should not be available
where the "actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would
be subjected to duress...[or] was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, wherever
negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged." MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.09(2) (Official Draft 1962). Perkins states that "it is clear that [coercion]...will excuse one
not otherwise at fault for almost any harm [except murder]." (emphasis added). R. PERKINS,
supra note I, at 953. "[T]here appears to be accord that the defense [of duress] cannot be
claimed if the compulsion arose by the defendant's own fault, negligence or misconduct [citations
omitted]." Id.; see Frasher v. State, 8 Md. App. 439, 449, 260 A.2d 656, 662, cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 959 (1970); State v. Fowler, 37 Or. App. 299, -, 587 P.2d 104, 103-05
(1978); State v. Patterson, 117 Or. 153, 156, 241 P. 977, 978 (1926) (duress not a defense where
defendant's prior act of embezzlement made threats of exposure possible). See also People v.
Simpson, 66 Cal. 2d 319, 327, 152 P.2d 339, 343-44 (1944); State v. McKinney, 19 Wash. App.
23, 573 P.2d 820 (1978); 34 CAN. REV. STAT. § 17 (Canadian Criminal Code allows excuse of
19851
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compulsion "if he is not a party to a conspiracy or association whereby he is subject to
compulsion"). In regard to English law, a key case in point states that one "one who [voluntarily
joins a criminal organization] has no cause for complaint if he is debarred from the defence of
duress in respect to threats afterward made to him." R. v. Fitzpatrick, 1977 N. Ir. 20. See LAW
COMMISSION, CRIMINAL LAW § 83, REPORT ON DEFENCES OF GENERAL APPLICATION 5-6, 13 (1977)
(discussing and applying theme of R. v. Fitzpatrick) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON DEFENCES].
(b) United States v. Gordon, 526 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir. 1975) (coercion defense requires
"well-grounded apprehension"); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 976 n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1950) (same); Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935) (same); State v. St.
Clair, 262 S.W. 2d 25, 27 (Mo. 1953) (same). The requirement of a well-grounded apprehension
is generally accepted in the United States, although the Model Penal Code, § 2.09, does not
require it. It is less clear that it is required in English law. See REPORT ON DEFENCES, supra
note 9(a), at 203 (stating that no decision has as yet turned on the "well-grounded apprehension"
point and quoting Lord Simon as explicitly uncertain on the point). On the other hand, modern
English criminal law formulations of duress have been cast in terms of what one could
"reasonably expect" of the victim, in the light of the victim's beliefs and state of mind, the
circumstances, and the threat itself. This leaves it possible-there are no pertinent cases-that
the requirement of a "well-grounded" (i.e., reasonable) belief is imported indirectly into the
concept of belief. For if a belief in the credibility of a threat, given all the circumstances and
the victim's state of mind, was unreasonable, would this not imply that one could reasonably
expect that conduct would not be based on that belief? See D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v.
Lynch, [1975] A.C. 653; G. WiLLiAms, supra note 1, at c. 25; REPORT ON DEFENCES, supra note
9(a), at 10. The interweaving of "subjective" and "objective" elements here is complex and
not entirely clear. See infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
(c) United States v. Gordon, 526 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir. 1975) (coercion defense requires
imminent threat); D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 358 (9th Cir. 1951) (same); Shannon
v. United States, 76 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935) (same); State v. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25,
27 (Mo. 1953) (same); Nail v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 700, 271 S.W. 1059 (1925) (same). The
Model Penal Code omits reference to the imminence of the threatened harm. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.09 (Official Draft 1962). However, United States courts have held to this requirement.
See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1980); United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d
543, 545 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911 (1978); People v. Richards, 269 Cal. App. 2d 768,
- 75 Cal. Rptr. 597, 602-03 (1969). In England the situation is a bit more ambiguous.
Williams states flatly that the threat must be "immediate and pressing." G. WILLiAms, supra
note 1, at 580. Smith and Hogan report that the imminent threat rule is "generally stated" to
be the case. J. SMTH & B. HOGAN, supra note 1, at 163. However, these later commentators
raise doubts because of R. v. Hudson, [1971] 2 All E.R. 244, which allowed a defense of duress
even though the threatened harm was not to occur until later in the day. Nevertheless, Hudson
still retains the idea behind the "imminence" concept-that no reasonable alternative exists
between the moment the threat exerts its power over the will and "destroys" or "neutralizes"
it, and the moment the victim must decide how to act. Id. at 247. This concept is the kernel of
the "imminence" criterion that is reflected in the concept of Victimization. See infra section
III. In regard to economic coercion, see, e.g., Bayshore Industries, Inc. v. Ziats, 232 Md. 167,
- 192 A.2d 487, 491 (1963) (threat to bar from future employment is similar to threat to
cause loss of present employment, sufficing for duress).
(d) For English law, see D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch, [1975] A.C. 653, 665
(Lord Morris); see also REPORT ON DEFENCES, supra note 9(a), at 304 ("Under the present law
it is clear that only threats of death or serious personal injury...."). United States law concerning
the coercion defense usually speaks of "death or serious bodily injury." See, e.g., State v. St.
Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo. 1953). There is also precedent in the common law for demanding
only that the threat be such that some hypothetical person, such as the "constant man" or the
person of "ordinary firmness" could not in the circumstances resist the threat. See Dawson,
Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 255 (1947) (reviewing early
[Vol. 42:65
VIC TIMIZA TION
change in recent years.' 0 The test for coercion amounts to a set of criteria
for applying the concept in the criminal defense context, that is, the'test
amounts to a set of conditions that are, jointly, necessary and sufficient to
establish the defense of coercion. It does not provide, however, a general
definition of the concept of coercion, a concept also applied in other legal
contexts that call for different tests. Nor does the test state the justification
history of "constant man" concept); see also Bata v. Central Penn Nat'l Bank, 423 Pa. 373,
- 224 A.2d 174, 180 (1966) (example of "person of ordinary firmness" as used in modem
American law). And plainly the same basic idea is incorporated in the Model Penal Code test
for duress. See infra note 13. An analysis and proposed rationale for making demands that
differ, for different contexts, in their stringency with respect to the nature and severity of the
threat, are presented in the course of the argument in this article. See infra text accompanying
notes 46-48, text following note 104 & text accompanying notes 138-63.
(e) United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1977) (duress defense requires
lack of opportunity to escape threat); United States v. Gordon, 526 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir.
1975) (same); Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935) (same); State v. St.
Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25, 27-28 (Mo. 1953) (same); Arp. v. State, 97 Ala. 5, -, 12 So. 301, 304
(1893) (same); R. v. Hudson, [1971] 2 All E.R. 244, 247 (same, under English law).
(f) The precise grounds on which the defendant is excused are not well settled, and the
positions taken on this issue vary widely. This, of course, is one of the chief questions this
study is designed to resolve. Some commentators have argued that duress is a justification
rather than an excuse. See, e.g., W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 374-78. Others have
treated coercion as an excuse. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 830-31
(1978); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSImLITY 14 (1968). "In searching for a rationale
for the defense of duress one encounters a mass of inconsistencies in the doctrine as it has
developed." Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the Right to Escape from Prison-A Step
Towards Incarceration Free from Sexual Assault, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 110, 121 (1975). See infra
note 154 (discussion and citations pertaining to theories of coercion).
(g) 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 434 (1800); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 30 (15th
ed. London 1809); R.I. Recreation Center v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603 (1st Cir.
1949); Brewer v. State, 72 Ark. 145, 78 S.W. 773 (1904); Watson v. State, 212 Miss. 788, 55
So.2d 441 (1951); State v. Dowell, 106 N.C. 722, 11 S.E. 525 (1890); State v. Nargashian, 26
R.I. 299, 58 A. 953 (1904). "The authorities seem to be conclusive that, at common law, no
man can excuse himself under the plea of necessity or compulsion for taking the life of an
innocent person." Arp. v. State, 97 Ala. 5, -, 12 So. 301, 303 (1895). Some state statutes
do, however, recognize duress as an excuse available for any crime. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 431 (1979); HAWAn RV. STAT., § 702-231 (1976 & Supp. 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 309 (Purdon 1983); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN., § 8.05 (Vernon 1974). In General Principles
of CriminalLaw, Hall reports that while the murder exception to the duress defense is maintained
verbally, the courts have not decided any United States cases squarely on that basis, managing
always to find some additional reason, for example, failure to seize an opportunity to escape,
as a basis for affirming murder convictions where duress was claimed. See J. HALL, supra note
1, at 439-40. For the English doctrine, see infra notes 10-11.
10. There has been a tendency in recent English law to extend the meaning of "imminent."
In R. v. Hudson, the court held that a threat to do injury at a future time, when the two young
women defendants had left the courtroom and gone home, was immediate enough for the
purposes of a duress defense to the charge of perjured testimony, the option of requesting
police protection not sufficing to negate the strength and immediacy of the threat. See R. v.
Hudson, [19711 2 All E.R. 244, 247. See also infra note 11 (modifications of murder exception
in English law).
1985]
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for excusing a person who was coerced. It does not explain certain puzzling
constraints on the defense.
One example of the kind of question the coercion test leaves unanswered
is why the defense is barred with respect to the charge of murder." This has
caused controversy that is of special theoretical interest. A small body of
literature has grown up in the attempt to challenge and reject, or to justify
and make sense of this exception.' 2 This exclusion of coercion as a defense
to murder seems to present a situation in which public policy rides roughshod
over both legal analysis and psychological reality.
Other questions have arisen in connection with the coercion defense. If
duress excuses, why need the threat always be one of death or serious injury?
Why not allow lesser threats to excuse if they are adequate to motivate a
person of "reasonable firmness" in the circumstances?'3 There are, after all,
other contexts of law where no threat of serious harm is necessary to establish
coercion (e.g., coerced confessions). 4 And there are legal contexts in which
a threat of harm to the person is not at all necessary for the excuse of
11. The leading English cases of D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch, [1975] A.C. 653,
and Abbott v. R., [1976] 3 All E.R. 140, 145, 146, seem to have established that duress can be
a defense for a person charged with murder as "a principal in the second degree" (aider and
abettor), but not for a person charged as a "principal in the first degree" (the actual perpetrator).
Even this limitation on use of the defense has recently been rendered a shade less certain by the
decision in R. v. Graham, which held that even a principal in the first degree may offer the
defense if the prosecution does not object. See R. v. Graham, [1982] 1 W.L.R. 294, 300-01. In
R. v. Graham, however, the absence of objection was due to the special circumstances of the
case, and it seems that the substantive point of the limitation was respected even though the
form was not.
12. See Dennis, Duress, Murder, and Criminal Responsibility, 96 L. Q. REv. 208 (1980);
Gardner, supra note 9(f), at 121; O'Regan, Duress and Murder, 35 MOD. L. REv. 596 (1972);
Smith, A Note on Duress, 1974 CuIM. L. R~v. 349; REPORT ON DEFENCES, supra note 9(a), at
15.
13. See MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.09(1) (Official Draft 1962). The test proposed in § 2.09
is as follows:
(1) It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to
constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to
use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of
reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. (2) The defense
provided by this Section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a
situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense
is also unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever
negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged. (3) [Presumptions
about husband and wife are abolished.].
Id. Thus, the Model Penal Code test, as compared to the common law test, omits the
requirements as to imminence and death or serious bodily injury. See id. The Model Penal
Code test also omits the murder exception. See id. Whether the victim's belief in the credibility
of the threat must be "well-grounded" seems unclear. If a "person of reasonable firmness"
means one who is reasonable in deciding how firm to be, the "well-grounded" requirement
would seem in substance to be retained. For a lengthy review of the literature preceding adoption
of the Model Penal Code test, see State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 432-40, 378 A.2d 755, 760-
64 (1977).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 111-16.
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coercion to exist (e.g., economic coercion). 5 The legal tests of coercion in
these latter two contexts differ substantially from each other, and each test
in turn differs substantially from the coercion test in the criminal defense
context. Nor do these three by any means exhaust the list of different types
of legal coercion. 16 That the tests of coercion differ is well established, but
why they differ has hardly been discussed.
Ultimately one wonders what general concept, if any, is guiding the
judges who have created the case law in this area. To find the general
concept one must turn from the concreteness of the various different legal
tests or criteria of coercion, to seek further for the underlying general
meaning of the concept that purportedly generates these different sets of
criteria for different types of contexts.
1. Coercion as the "overborne will"
One kind of answer to the request for a general concept of coercion is
ubiquitous in the legal literature on the topic. This answer is that coercion,
whatever the context, generally has to do with the individual's will, and that,
specifically, coercion consists in "overcoming," "overbearing," "overpower-
ing," "breaking," "destroying," "subverting," "removing," "neutraliz-
ing," or otherwise through some traumatic inner ordeal, rendering the
individual's will impotent. Coercion is spoken of as being a "pressure" that
"compels the will to yield," or on the other hand as a "suction process"
that "drains it of its capacity for free choice.'
' 7
15. See infra text accompanying notes 55-80.
16. Broadly speaking, the excuse or avoidance claim of coercion can apply wherever a
legally crucial action occurs, that is, wherever a legal outcome hinges upon the act in question.
The coerced act may be an act which warrants or elicits initiation of some action at law, or it
may be some crucial act that is itself part of an already ongoing legal process. One can classify
the uses by reference to the area of law in which the legal process lies (criminal law, economic
law, wills, adoptions, labor relations, etc.); or one can classify the uses by reference to the
stage of a process (by reference to the initial act, such as committing the crime; or by reference
to subsequent acts in a legal process, such as confessing, pleading guilty, testifying, etc.).
17. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) ("overborne" will used
with respect to coerced confession); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 634 (1961)
("broken" will used with respect to coerced confession); id. at 576 ("suction process" used
with respect to coerced confession); Stein v. United States, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953) ("over-
borne" used with respect to coerced confession); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Velez, 285 F. Supp. 123,
125 (D.P.R. 1968) ("compels" used with respect to economic coercion); Wise v. Midtown
Motors, Inc., 231 Minn. 46, -, 42 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1950) ("destroyed" will used with
respect to economic coercion); McFadin v. Catron, 120 Mo. 252, -, 25 S.W. 506, 512
(1894) ("coerced force destroying the free agency or will power"); Rubenstein v. Rubenstein,
20 N.J. 359, -, 120 A.2d 11, 13 (1956) ("overcome" will used with respect to economic
coercion); State v. Gann., 244 N.W.2d 746, 752 (N.D. 1976) ("removed" free will used with
respect to coerced criminal act); Talmadge v. Robinson, 158 Ohio St. 333, -, 109 N.E.2d
496, 500 (1952) (same); De Grassi v. De Grassi, 533 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976)
("subvert and overthrow the will" used with respect to undue influence); Great Northern
Railway Co. v. State, 200 Wash. 392, -, 93 P.2d 694, 706 (1939) ("pressure" and "break
1985]
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This use of language is rhetorically rich, dramatic, and correspondingly
lacking in objective specificity of meaning. The language and imagery suggest
that the topic is an "inner," psychic event, the outcome of ordeal or trauma:
A psychic capacity has been seriously disabled, the person has been deprived
of the psychologically effective use of a mental agency or function. If one
tries to spell out more fully, literally, and exactly what the imagery portrays,
difficulties and doubts arise. This core idiom, nevertheless, is so familiar and
commonly used that it is plausible to suppose it has a legitimate, intelligible
use, even if one cannot offhand state exactly what it is. Since this idiom is
so pervasive in the case law on coercion, its role in legal reasoning deserves
careful examination. To this inquiry we now turn.
One obvious tack to take in conducting the inquiry is to examine contexts
where the idiom is used paradigmatically. Indeed'the idiom suggests two
paradigmatic situations: "Gun-at-the-head" coercion threats, and torture-
induced confessions. The legal use of the concept of coercion has greatly
extended the use of the idiom of the broken will beyond these paradigms.
Nevertheless it will be a useful foundation for analysis if we begin by
accepting the language at face value, or at least in a sympathetic spirit, in
order to see what legal cogency it might have as applied, to begin with, in
the gun-at-the-head paradigm. Since the gun-at-the-head paradigm has its
paradigmatic home in the context of coercion as a defense to a criminal
charge, it is to this context that we turn first.
Since coercion is said to be the breaking or overbearing of the victim's
will, coerced behavior is often characterized as "involuntary."' 8 One obvious
way in which this could be taken is to assume it implies absence of effective
power to will, that is, unwilled behavior. One may then argue that, as
unwilled, the behavior could not constitute the actus reus of the crime.' 9
down the resistance" used with respect to economic coercion); R. v. Hudson, [1971] 2 All E.R.
244, 246-47 ("destroyed" and "neutralized" used with respect to coerced criminal act); R. v.
Bourne, 36 Crim. App. 125, 128 (1952) ("overborne" will used with respect to coerced criminal
act); The Attorney-General v. Whelan, 11934] Ir.R. 518 ("overborne" will used with respect to
criminal act), quoted in D.W. ELLIOTT & J.C. WOOD, CRIMINAL LAW 47 (3d ed. 1974).
18. J. SMITH & B. HOGAN, supra note 1, at 164; J. ARCHBOLD: PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND
PIIAcTIcE IN CRIMINAL CASEs § 17, at 55 (41st ed. 1982). "[I]t is clearly established that duress
provides a defence... [if] the commission of the alleged offence was no longer the voluntary act
of the accused." R. v. Hudson, [1971] 2 All E.R. 244, 246.
19. The uses of "involuntary" in the law are protean. Inevitably there are differing usages
and opinions in regard to the meaning and interrelations of the terms "involuntary," "un-
willed," "act," and "actus reus." There is, however, an important line of interpretation and
usage in which "involuntary" implies "unwilled behavior" and hence absence of an "act" or
"actus reus." See Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law, 26 YALE L. J. 645-
52 (1917); see also O.W. HoLmas, THE CoaMoN LAW 73-74 (1963). And as recently as the
Model Penal Code, § 1.13(2), (3), and § 2.01(2), the same idea was proposed in substance.
LaFave and Scott also expound this approach. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 1, at
179-81; see also G. WILLiAmS, supra note 1, at 31-34; Dennis, Duress, Murder and Criminal
Responsibility, 96 L. Q. REv. 208, 220 (1980).
The intent in the main text above is not to argue that "unwilled" does necessarily imply
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Since there can be no crime if there is no actus reus, this would logically be
a complete defense.2 0 Thus the idiom of the broken will, taken at face value,
is verbally adequate to establish coercion as a general defense.
The difficulty with this approach arises at the factual level. The shift
from the idiom of the broken will to the more specific and technical legal
claim that the behavior was "unwilled" generates what most commentators
have viewed as unacceptable factual implications. 2' In the typical coercion
case, the person who acts under coercion is not a mere automaton, a mere
bodily extension of the coercer's will. If we do use the idiom of the "will,"
the correct characterization of the facts requires us to say that the victim of
coercion is one who wills to comply. True, it would also be idiomatically
correct to say that the victim acts "unwillingly. ' 2  In short, the English
idiomatic use of "will" and its verbal variant forms is complex and not
designed for the purpose of science or even of prima facie logical consistency.
The substance of the matter, however, requires us to recognize that a victim
of coercion may deliberate and choose how to act, and may continuously
"involuntary" and, therefore, absence of an "act" or "actus reus," but to pursue that line of
thought to see where it goes. Then the discussion will take up other ways of interpreting these
notions and their interrelations. In remarks on coercion, compulsion, and necessity, the court
in Gillars v. United States characterizes necessity (and, by implication, coercion) as a case of
having "no choice." See Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 976 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
Lord Simon, in the leading case of D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch, says that 'Volition'
I take to be synonymous with 'will'...and an involuntary physical movement is not an 'act."'
[1975] A.C. 653, 689. Lord Simon, however, then goes on to say that in duress the act is
voluntary. Id.; see id. at 709-10 (discussion of Lord Edmund-Davies of what he calls "theory
2"). The Report on Defences of General Application seems to wander into at least suggesting
that duress produces incapacity to act lawfully when it says that "[t]he underlying analysis of
duress is that it takes account of the infirmity of human nature, and recognizes that ordinary
people cannot be compelled by the fear of a criminal sanction when by duress they are deprived
of their proper judgment." REPORT ON DEFENCES, supra note 9(a), at 14. On the whole,
however, the Report on Defences views behavior under duress as willed, and as including both
actus reus and mens rea. See id.
20. In the sense of the word as used herein, such a defense would not be an excuse, for
it would amount to a denial that the criminally forbidden act had been committed, rather than
a confession that the criminal act had been committed, along with a plea to avoid condemnation
and penalty. For a discussion of concepts of excuse that have a close relationship to this, see
G. FLETCHER, supra note 9(f), at 456-58, and Fingarette, Rethinking Criminal Law Excuses, 89
YALE L.J. 1002 (1980).
21. See, e.g., J. HALL, supra note 1, at 446; W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at
374; G. WIn Ais, supra note I, at 577-78; Dennis, supra note 12, at 234-35; Wasik, Duress
and Criminal Responsibility, 1977 CRi. L. REv. 453, 455. See also D.P.P. for Northern Ireland
v. Lynch, [1975] A.C. 653 (Lord Kilbrandon); id. at 707 (Lord Edmund-Davies). The famous
argument of the English jurist, James Fitzjames Stephen, viewing duress as a matter of competing
threats by the coercer and by the law, implies that duress is a matter of competing motives for
choice rather than a lack of will. See 2 J.F. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIuMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 107-08 (1883); see also REPORT ON DEFENCES, supra note 9(a) (same view taken). Sir
Rupert Cross emphasizes duress as choice under constraint, rather than as "non voluit." See
Cross, Murder Under Duress, 28 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 372-73 (1978).
22. "[W]hat is done will be done most unwillingly but yet intentionally." D.P.P. for
Northern Ireland v. Lynch, [1975] A.C. 653, 670 (Lord Morris).
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act intentionally and purposefully-as an intelligent agent of the coercer-in
order to keep conduct in accord with the current demands of the coercer.
All this establishes in fact what is incompatible with the meaning of the legal
concept of "unwilled behavior."
Thus, if we say that in coercion the will is "bent," or "overborne," we
certainly do not mean "bent" in the way an axle is bent, or overborne in
the way a soldier is overborne by an advancing tank-that it is rendered
inoperative, put out of service. Nor, if we speak of the will as "broken" or
"destroyed," do we intend a case of losing the use of one's mind, nor even
losing the use of a "part" of it. On the contrary, coerced conduct is plainly
a case of using one's mind.23 The victim's decision as to what to do may be
made in fear or terror, but the behavior is not sheer mindless panic. No
doubt it is the awareness of these unacceptable factual implications, if
"broken will" is taken in a literalistic way, that often leads the courts to
qualify the idiom and to speak of the loss of "free will" 24 in coercion, rather
than of the loss of "will" simpliciter.25
23. Thus we exclude such recognized forms of involuntariness as, for example, the flailing
of an epileptic, the fall of one who trips and stumbles, or the bodily movements of one who
suddenly and totally loses consciousness. These are the kinds of behavior that are factually
quite untypical of coercion, and are forms of involuntariness that are paradigmatic of literally
unwilled behavior, and hence of absence of the actus reus.
24. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
25. Interestingly enough, if one were to accept the translation of the broken will into an
absence of will and consequent absence of actus reus, the coercion defense would be too strong.
Logically, it would seem to imply that coercion should then be a defense to an allegation of
murder. LaFave and Scott, make much the same point. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra
note I, at 374 n.3. But this of course is not the law. It is true that the rule excluding coercion
as a defense to murder has been criticized as bad law. To some it has seemed unacceptably
unrealistic. Hobbes' epigram-"If I doe it not, I die presently, if I doe it, I die afterwards;
therefore by doing it there is time of life gained"-expresses the purported irrationally of
expecting the threat of future punishment to have any effect where the alternative to killing an
innocent person is one's own immediate death. LEviAntA, 1651, pt. 2, ch. 27. Lord Wilberforce,
in D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch, seems to reject as unjustified that the law should
expect self-sacrifice in order to save another. [1975] A.C. 653, 681. In this connection, the
South African case of S. v. Goliath (1972), (3) S.A. 1 (A.D.), is often cited in English law. In
general, the movement in English law has been to narrow the murder exception to the coercion
defense rather than to abandon it altogether. See supra note 18. Dennis argues against the
exception, but not on the ground that the victim behaves without "will." See Dennis, supra
note 12, at 236. Some state statutes on the defense of duress have not incorporated the common
law exception as to murder. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 431 (1979); HAwAII REv.
STAT., § 702-231 (1976 & Supp. 1983); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN., § 8.05 (Vernon 1974). Hall's
discussion stresses the reluctance of courts to convict squarely on the basis of this exception to
the coercion defense. See J. HALL, supra note 1, at 439-40. The Model Penal Code, § 2.09,
omits the murder exception. But the rule has long been law and an adequate account of coercion
ought at least to show why the rule has plausibility. See supra note 9(g). If judges really did
conceive of the coerced act as literally willess, without intent or self-control, it would become
implausible to suppose that they would have stayed with the rule because of public policy
concern that to allow coercion as an excuse for murder might encourage acquiescence in
murderous enterprises, or because of moral concern that one ought to sacrifice one's own life
rather than take an innocent person's life. Such considerations would be beside the point in
this article since they presuppose self-control, intent, and will.
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There are other possible interpretations, however, of the language of the
"broken," "overborne," "destroyed" or "neutralized" will, interpretations
that avoid so literalistic a tack, and that nevertheless aim at translating the
idiomatic language into some kind of legal involuntariness. An obvious range
of alternatives is based on viewing the issue as a matter of absence of mens
rea rather than absence of the actus reus. Thus the claim of a broken will
may be interpreted as the claim that even though an act is in the legal sense
willed, the act in some respect lacks the requisite mens rea because of some
form of "volitional defect." Such an approach poses the question as to
the specific form of volitional defect that we are to presume results in
involuntariness and absence of mens rea.
The defense of ignorance or mistake of fact does plainly pertain to mens
rea and has also been characterized in terms of "involuntariness. ' 27 If I do
not know my act will have a certain consequence material to the criminality
of the act, then perforce I do not intend, in doing the act, to cause that
consequence; and so, finally, it can be said that in that sense I did not
voluntarily bring it about. But to say I did not voluntarily bring it about
remains, in substance, no more than a roundabout way of referring to the
original substantive point that I was mistaken about what I was doing. That
one can eventually render the point verbally in terms of "involuntariness"
should not obscure the truth that none of this has anything in fact to do
with any psychological defect of "volitional capacity," the kind of thing
plainly suggested by the idiom of the broken will.
Sometimes the courts will say of irrational persons-the insane, mentally
defective, or otherwise gravely mentally disabled-that they do not act
voluntarily; and this has been characterized as a form of lack of mens rea.28
26. D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 362 (9th Cir. 1951) (voluntariness, when
not negated by coercion, requires act be done "purposefully, freely,...intended and uncon-
strained"); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 976 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ("a voluntary
mind" negated by coercion); R. v. Hudson, [1971] 2 All E.R. 244, 246 ("no longer the voluntary
act of the accused"); R. v. Bourne, 36 Crim. App. 125, 128 (1952) ("[a] plea of duress...as
showing that she had no mens rea because her will was overborne by threats...."). In the
Canadian case of R. v. Paquette, 70 D.L.R. 3d 129, 135 (1977), the Canadian Supreme Court
held that duress negatives the "common intention [general intent] to carry out an unlawful
purpose." Furthermore, the absence of general intent was held to be relevant to coercion in
United States v. Hearst. See United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 889, 891 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
See also infra note 27 (quotation from Blackstone concerning defect of will).
27. The defense of action in ignorance of a material fact is a form of absence of
voluntariness, a position formulated as early as Aristotle. See NicoiiACHtAN ETHcs, Bk. V,
Ch. 8. It is a view central to Spinoza's views on freedom and bondage. It is expressed early in
English law in 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 42 (1678). Blackstone said: "[I]gnorance or
mistake is another defect of will;...[f]or here the deed and the will acting separately there is not
that conjunction between them, which is necessary to form a criminal act. But this must be an
ignorance or mistake of fact, and not an error in point of law...." 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARmES *27. Among modem commentators, Hall adopts this formulation. See J. HALL,
supra note 1, at 370-71; see also RUSSELL ON CaIm 71-72 (J.W.C. Turner, ed. 1963) (discussing
this formulation in historical terms).
28. "Insanity, which robs one of the power to make intelligent choice between good and
evil ....." Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. Rav. 974, 1004 (1932). Goldstein discusses one such
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The involuntariness referred to is constituted in substance by either or both
of two conditions of mind as traditionally construed by the court, either
serious loss of the ability to reason, or serious loss of self-control from
causes other than the loss of reasoning ability.
29
Where there is loss of reasoning capacity, the behavior can be charac-
terized as "involuntary" on the basis of argument analogous to that used in
connection with mistake and ignorance. 0 For analogous reasons, this kind
of "involuntariness," therefore, is not pertinent to any involuntariness one
might find in coercion. Coercion victims, who comply rationally with the
orders of the coercer, are not in fact persons whose reasoning capacity is
"destroyed" or "broken."
Analysis of the precise nature of loss of self-control is often evaded by
use of the legal catch-all term "involuntary." As has already been noted,
point of view generally under the rubric of the "liberal" position, a position from which deviant
behavior is viewed as "the product of forces beyond the individual's control...." A. GOLDSTEIN,
THt INsANIT DEFENSE 14 (1967). One common psychiatric view, based on belief in psychological
determinism, implies that in the only sense in which "free" makes sense as applied to actions,
a neurotic or psychotic act would not be free. See Knight, Determinism, 'Freedom', and
Psychotherapy, 9 PSYCHIATRY 251 (1946). Another modern view, from the very different point
of view of a legal scholar, expresses the significance of the excuse of insanity as demarcating
the loss or absence of that "autonomy" which is characteristic of the sane. See 0. FLETCHER,
supra note 9(0, at 846. Morse formulates the legal import of "craziness" in terms of "harder
and easier choices," which seems to suggest the issue of voluntariness, although Morse says he
uses the phrase in its "commonsense" meaning. See Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and
Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 527, 563 (1978). Morse
summarizes generally: "[I]f an actor's behavior is apparently and inexplicably irrational and
crazy, the law and also persons in general assume that because of mental disorder the actor was
not in control of his behavior-that it was not chosen." Id. at 563-64. That mental affliction
bears ultimately on legal responsibility by reason of absence of mens rea, i.e., that the act is
not "a product of choice," seems to be the gravamen of Professor Herbert Wechsler's opening
remarks in the Panel Discussion on Insanity as a Defense. See Second Judicial Circuit, Annual
Judicial Conference, Insanity as a Defense, 37 F.R.D. 365, 381 (1964). See also State v. White,
60 Wash. 2d 551, -, 374 P.2d 942, 965, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1962); State v. Maish,
29 Wash. 2d 52, -, 185 P.2d 486, 490-94 (1947); State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 740-
44, 15 S.E. 982, 990-91 (1892). Kadish proposes the concept of absence of general mens rea to
cover excuses such as insanity. See Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273
(1968). See generally H. FINGARETTE & A. HASSE, MENTAL DISABILTIES AND CRIMINAL RESPON-
sIBrLrrY 44-65 (1979) (full discussion of this theme).
29. One or both of these two criteria appear in the insanity context in M'Naghten's Case.
See Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Finnelly 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843)
(defendant labored under "defect of reason," so he "did not know the nature and quality of
the act.... or...[that it] was wrong"). They also appear in so-called "irresistible impulse" cases.
See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897) ("his will...completely destroyed");
Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, -, 2 So. 854, 866-67 (1887) ("lost the power to choose
between the right and wrong.. .his free agency was at the time destroyed"). Furthermore, the
criteria appear in various versions of the now widely adopted Model Penal Code test. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Official Draft 1962) ("lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality [or wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law").
30. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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this could not be taken to amount to unwilled behavior. On the other hand,
loss of self-control behavior has been characterized not as unwilled but as
"irresistibly" willed.3 "Irresistibility" then becomes a candidate for express-
ing the kind of involuntariness in coercion that is the basis of the defense.
The "irresistibility" approach to the matter has had support not only in
legal literature but also in philosophical literature.
3 2
The practical difficulties that such an approach poses for the law are
familiar to those acquainted with the literature on criminal responsibility.
Lady Wooton summarily stated the issue some time ago, echoing the remarks
of the Lord Chief Justice of England: The step between "he did not resist
his impulse" and "he could not resist his impulse" is one that is "incapable
of scientific proof."3 3 Certainly, the courts have found no rational formula,
no criteria or paradigmatic patterns of evidence that unambiguously lead to
a reasoned conclusion on the question. The problem is not that expert
witnesses disagree on this issue because of a dispute about the facts; they
may indeed agree on the facts, but they disagree on what conclusion to
draw. 4 The revealing feature of the disagreement is that there is no agreement
as to what facts would even in principle settle it. In short, the question is
not a factual one; it is differences in professional ideology or theory that
seem to be at issue.
35
The point of the preceding remarks is not merely to comment on the
practical difficulties that emphasis on "irresistibility" can create for the
coercion defense; the main point is to establish that the analysis of the
coercion defense as a form of "irresistibility" defense is an incorrect analysis.
That it is incorrect follows from the fact that when coercion is the defense,
these familiar and ubiquitous difficulties over irresistibility typically do not
emerge. In court cases where coercion is at issue, it is quite uncharacteristic
to present experts' testimony delving in depth into the psychology of the
defendant, whereas such testimony is commonly the centerpiece in cases
where "irresistible impulse" or "loss of self-control" are the bases of
defense. Now if the irresistibility of desires, motives, or impulses were indeed
the essence of the "involuntariness" in coercion, there is no good reason
why such elaborate expert testimony, and the usual difficulties associated
with proof of "irresistibility," should be absent when the existence of
coercion is placed in question.
31. See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 67-79; Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a
Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 956 (1952). For a use of this language in the
context of coercion, see Gallaher Drug Co. v. Robinson, 13 Ohio Misc. 216, -, 232 N.E.2d
668, 670 (1965) ("irresistibly driven toward...irrational action").
32. Frankfurt, for example, has argued that we can explain the excusatory force of
coercion only if we assume as an essential condition of coercion that the victim's desires or
motives are "beyond his ability to control." Frankfurt, Coercion and Moral Responsibility, in
ESSAYS IN FREEDOM OF ACTION 65-86, 72 (T. Honderich ed. 1973).
33. B. WooroN, CRINE AND THE CRIINAL LAW 73 (1963).
34. H. FINrARETTE & A. HASSE, supra note 28, at 52.
35. Id. at 62.
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Turning to involuntariness as possibly being a "loss of self-control" in
some other or broader sense than an "irresistible" desire or impulse, we can
see that the very notion of loss of self-control seems to be at odds with the
facts in the defense of coercion. On the contrary, the victim's life may
depend on keeping self-control and on carefully obeying the coercer. 6 Panic
or other loss of self-control may frustrate the coercer's aims, and may evoke
fear or anger reactions, thus provoking the coercer into bringing about the
very disaster the victim fears. Far from being non-responsible because
irresistibly driven,37 the victim of coercion may manifest great, even heroic
responsibility and self-control. Coercion does not destroy the responsibility-
status of the actor, but it excuses the actor from culpability.
There remains still another approach to understanding coercion as "in-
voluntariness": The coerced choice may be characterized as "unfree, ' 3 or
as "unfair, '3 9 or as being "no real choice."''4 It is initially plausible that
these characterizations should imply "involuntariness," but analysis quickly
reveals problems. The centrally relevant difficulty is that if these phrases are
to be used precisely enough for legal purposes, then we need to know more
specifically what mental state, if any, they designate. After all, there are
many kinds of everyday situations in which one could say, with apt every
day English language idiom, that "I had no real (or fair, or free) choice,"
and yet not at all have in mind conditions that would serve as a legal basis
for the defense of coercion against a criminal charge. It may be, however,
that a closer and more sympathetic examination of these idioms would
suggest a more specific and legally usable meaning. We shall examine each
36. This important feature of coercion is fatally obscured by remarks in the English Law
Commission Report to the effect that duress deprives the victims of "their proper judgment."
See REPoRT oN DEFENcEs, supra note 9(a), at 14.
37. See Frankfurt, supra note 32.
38. State v. Gann, 244 N.W.2d 746, 752 (N.D. 1976) ("removes the free will of the
actor"); Wise v. Midtown Motors Inc., 231 Minn. 46, -, 42 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1950)
("destroys the victim's free will"); Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, -, 2 So. 854, 866 (1887)
("free agency.. .destroyed"). See Newman & Weitzer, Duress, Free Will and the Criminal Law,
30 S. CAL. L. REv. 313 (1957).
39. Wasik, supra note 21, at 454 ("whether the accused had a fair opportunity to make
the choice"); see G. FLETCHER, supra note 9(f), at 833-34 (Fletcher supports the "unfair"
doctrine, which he says is explicit in German law and French law, to the effect that the question
in duress defense is what we can "fairly" expect of the person).
40. Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 976 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ("leaves no choice
of action"); Wise v. Midtown Motors Inc., 231 Minn. 46, -, 42 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1950)
("whether or not the party really had a choice"); Frankfurt, supra note 32, at 77 (in effect
arguing that the coerced person is quite literally unable to choose, i.e., "He cannot effectively
choose to do otherwise."). See Tallmadge v. Robinson, 158 Ohio St. 333, -, 109 N.E.2d
496, 500 (1952) (economic coercion: "whether the party affected really had a choice"); Sistrom
v. Anderson, 51 Cal. 2d 213, -, 124 P.2d 372, 376 (1942) (economic coercion: "The test in
any case is whether the complaining party was or was not in a position to exercise his own
will"); see also Gardner, supra note 9(f), at 133 (proposing as one relevant interpretation of
duress-necessity defense that "forces acting on him made 'choice' impossible").
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idiom in turn, and in the process begin to make some substantive progress
toward understanding the true content of the coercion concept.
Of the three characterizations, "unfree choice" is the least promising as
an idiom that could lead us to an identifiable psychological condition which
would fulfill the two conditions necessary, that is, correspond to "broken
will" and have a clear and specific legal excusatory potential. In the first
place, it does not necessarily follow that if I am not free to choose I am
therefore coerced. For example, I am not free to choose to speak Swahili;
nor am I free to loan you money (because I have promised to loan what I
have to another person). But in neither case am I coerced. On the other
hand, neither is it plainly entailed that a coerced choice is unfree. Nozick
used this example of a choice that is coerced but nevertheless free: The
coercer makes a threat which is credible and which frightens the victim into
compliance, but in reality the coercer never had the power to carry out the
threat. Here, says Nozick, the compliant victim was in fact free to refuse to
comply, but the choice was made under coercion.
4'
Of course one may quibble about the meanings of the terms and these
particular uses of "free" and "coerced." In each illustration the conclusion
rests on acceptance of certain intelligible but still debatable uses of "free"
and "coerced." What such illustrations definitely bring out is the fact that
an explanation of coercion in terms of the concept "free," rather than
reducing our difficulties only adds to them. Debates over the meaning of
"freedom" and "free choice" fill many more volumes than do debates about
the meaning of "coercion." Therefore, it is not a wise strategy to explain
the problematic concept of "coercion" in terms of the far more problematic
concept "free."
We turn, then, from "unfree" choice to "unfair" choice. It deserves
notice that in everyday English usage the notion of "coercion" need not
necessarily imply unfairness. The policeman who points a gun at the criminal
assailant's head, and orders the latter to drop his gun and surrender, is
surely using coercion, but he is not acting unfairly. Of course this is not
coercion in the legal sense at issue here-coercion as a defense to a criminal
charge. It remains, then, to ask: Does the legal defense of coercion necessarily
imply a claim that the choice was "unfair"? The answer, roughly speaking,
is yes.
The coercer's threat must be unlawful,42 and in that legal sense the victim
was not allowed a "fair" choice. If one speaks of coercion as implying
41. Nozick, Coercion, in Philosophy, Science, and Method, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ERNEST NAGEL 440 (1969).
42. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 1, at 374 (duress defined as "unlawful threat....");
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (Official Draft 1962) (duress defined as "[u]se of, or a threat to
use, unlawful force .... "). See R. PERKINs, supra note 1, at 956 (omitting to include this
requirement in his explanation of duress, but immediately afterwards, in discussing Necessity
(which he also labels "Duress of Circumstance"), distinguishing Necessity from Compulsion-
duress by reference to absence of wrongful act in former); State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421,
-, 378 A.2d 755, 764 (1977) (using Model Penal Code test). The Model Penal Code test or
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unfair choice, it may also be plausible to say that the choice, therefore, was
close variants that also explicitly specify the "unlawful" character of the coercer's act of
coercion, are being adopted increasingly widely in case law and statutes. See supra note 13
(Model Penal Code test). What is noteworthy, however, is that this element of the test is so
typically accepted without comment, one feels that it makes explicit what is self-evident and
needs no comment. Even the rather lengthy discussion in the Model Penal Code incorporates
this element without commenting on it. See Comments, MODEL PEtNAL CODE 7-8 (Tent. Draft
No. 10, 1960). A review of case reports will reveal that although a court may not and usually
does not comment explicitly on the point, the facts and the comments thereon either plainly
imply or explicitly establish that the coercive threat is unlawful. In the view of the present
writer, this wrongfulness of the coercer's act is essential to understanding why duress is a legal
basis for excuse or avoidance. See infra text at section IV. In contrast, emphasis on the
subjective, psychological impact of coercion has led to an almost total lack of comment on the
legal status of the coercer's act, and to a failure to appreciate clearly the rationale that justifies
excuse/avoidance where duress has operated.
One might ask: Could a lawful demand or threat amount to legal coercion? Of course
there is something odd and improbable about the idea of a situation in which a lawful threat
is used to coerce someone to do an illegal act, and this is no doubt why the "unlawful threat"
condition is generally taken for granted without further comment. But in fact such situations
do occur. For example, in O'Sullivan v. Fisher, the police lawfully ordered a drunk to leave
private premises where he was trespassing; then, when he had dutifully stepped out into the
street, they arrested him for public drunkenness. See O'Sullivan v. Fisher, [1954] S.A.S.R. 33,
as reported in G. WmLIAmS, CRnaNAL LAW: THEa GENERAL PART 759 (2d ed. 1961). The court
held that the defense of duress did not apply because the police order was lawful. Id. This
result is logical insofar as the duress defense, specifically, is concerned, if one accepts the
essential role of the wrongfulness of the alleged coercer's act. The other side of the coin is the
argument that one who is given an authoritative order (for example, by a judge in proceedings
where he has or plausibly claims jurisdiction or by a police officer in the performance of duty,
etc.) should be excused on that ground (not on the ground of duress) if the act commanded
turns out to be illegal. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1969) (not guilty because
unlawful act was at direction of police officer); United States v. Mancuso, 139 F.2d 90, 91-92
(3d Cir. 1943) (defendant not convictable for failure to obey draft board because of reliance on
judicial decree). It is true that in these latter cases the law-officer's order was in the end
determined to have been based on the law-officer's error; but if an ultimately unwarranted
order from such a source will excuse the unlawful act of the defendant, surely a legally
warranted order would do so.
In reality, then, it seems that the courts tacitly do make the finer distinctions called for by the
present article. That is, if the defendant was initially doing something wrong (in the sense
explained infra text accompanying notes 80 & 172), and thus was not an "innocent victim"
(inthe sense explained supra note 9(a) and accompanying text and infra note 52 and accompa-
nying text), then a lawful order to do what would ordinarily be a lawful act will not constitute
coercion, or an excuse of any kind, if because of the defendant's initial wrongdoing it turns
out that the act is unlawful. See O'Sullivan v. Fisher, [1954] S.A.S.R. 33, as reported in G.
WILLiAmS, supra, at 759; see also Frasher v. State, 8 Md. App. 439, 260 A.2d 656 (having
contraband drugs in his possession, defendant was lawfully ordered to cross state line into
-Maryland, then convicted for possession in Maryland; court uses rationale as, in essence, stated
above), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 959 (1970); State v. Miller, 187 So.2d 461 (La. App. 1966)
(sheriffs ordered disconnected private car radio to be connected and, contrary to law, tuned
into sheriff's radio band; held, not guilty). But see State v. Ragland, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 424, 233
A.2d 698 (1967) (car improperly parked, driver ordered by police to drive to station, but, as it
turned out, driver had suspended license; defendant then charged with driving with suspended
license; dictum that in this respect there was no guilt, though defendant's conviction on other
grounds affirmed).
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not voluntary. There is no gross impropriety in so doing. On the other hand,
there is in law no tight or necessary connection between the word "unfair-
ness" and involuntariness. More pertinent yet to present purposes is that the
use here of the term "involuntariness" has as its substantive reference the
unlawfulness of another's conduct, not a psychological state of the victim.
Thus if we are to treat the idiom of the "broken will" as referring to an
unfair choice, we must in turn see it as a roundabout way of referring to
the unlawfulness of a second party's act. This is linguistically odd or at least
misleading; it is, more importantly, a tacit shift of the logical center of
interest of the inquiry. The dramatic language of the breaking of the will,
which had seemed to be expressive of a certain traumatic psychic event in
the victim's mind, has here turned out to be an indirect way of referring to
the legal status of the coercer's act. In any case, the essential reference to
the legal wrongfulness of the coercer's act will remain as a cornerstone of
the concept of coercion, and of Victimization, to be developed below.
We turn now to coercion as allowing "no real choice." '43 This character-
ization is obviously highly idiomatic. As has been seen, this cannot mean
that there was literally no will, or no self-control, or even that there was no
responsible choice. One plausible interpretation of what the "no real choice"
idiom connotes is that there was an absence of any reasonable choice. That
is to say, no reasonable alternative existed," no alternative could reasonably
be preferred. Hence what the individual does is under the circumstances
reasonable. More than that, it is the only reasonable thing to do. But then
the quest for "involuntariness," following the trail from the "broken will"
to "no real choice" to "no reasonable choice," has once again led to a
sense of "involuntariness" that refers to a legal norm rather than to inner
43. See supra note 40.
44. The requirement that there be no reasonable escape from the threat is in substance
uniformly held to be a necessary element of the coercion defense. See R.I. Recreation Center
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1949) ("there must be no reasonable
opportunity to escape the compulsion without committing the crime"); Shannon v. United
States, 76 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935). Having a similar logical force is the formulation that:
"[T]he defendant could not reasonably have been expected to resist...." See REPORT ON
DEFENCaS, supra note 9(a), at 15 (advocating this formulation). Sometimes the point is made
more colloquially: "The person claiming the defense of coercion and duress must be a person
whose resistance has brought him to the last ditch." D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338,
359 (9th Cir. 1951). See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at 378. Although the English
case of R. v. Hudson is in the circumstances of that case generous in interpreting the principle,
the same basic principle is invoked. See R. v. Hudson, [1971] 2 All E.R. 244.
Frankfurt explicitly rejects the idea that "no real choice" as applied to coercion could
mean no reasonable alternative. See Frankfurt, supra note 32, at 77. His argument, however,
is based on his assumption that the victim of coercion is excused because, due to "irresistible
impulse," the victim is not a responsible actor. He then argues that reasonable conduct is
incompatible with the assumption that the individual is not responsible, and he concludes,
therefore, that coerced acts cannot be reasonable acts. See id. As previously noted, however, a
coercion victim may indeed act responsibly and reasonably, and even be justly praised for
heroism. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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psychic trauma. The issue is now the reasonableness of the choice, as
determined in law, rather than the psychic disablement of the victim.
In summing up to this point, then, we have found the coerced act to be
plausibly characterized as involuntary only insofar as that term is taken to
allude to objective legal norms, either to the unlawfulness of a threat, or to
the unreasonableness of a choice. On the other hand, the language of the
"overborne" or "broken" will leads us down a blind alley if we try to take
its legal force as arising out of some subjective condition of inner psychic
trauma or breakdown. It is now appropriate, therefore, to put aside the
rhetoric of the "broken will" idiom used as a psychological rationale for
the defense of coercion, and to turn instead to a systematic account of the
operative legal test for criminal coercion.
2. A Positive Account of "Coercion" as Defense to a Criminal Charge
The preceding analysis ended with the suggestion that a crucial feature
of coercion is the absence of any "real choice," that is, the absence of any
reasonable alternative. This suggestion can now be taken up systematically.
The classical test of criminal coercion necessarily entails the "no real
choice" idea. It is implied by the conjunction of several elements of the legal
test: (1) For coercion as a defense to a criminal charge to succeed, the test
requires that the coercer's unlawful threat should have created for the victim
a well-grounded belief that death or grave injury would be imminent on
failure to comply with the coercer's command; (2) such compliance must not
amount to participation in the killing of an innocent person;4 and (3) the
victim must be "innocent," that is, it must not be that the victim's own
conduct culpably rendered the victim vulnerable to the coercer's threat. From
these three propositions it follows that the victim has two alternatives only.
One alternative is for the victim, innocent up to the point of decision, to
resist and thereby foreseeably to be quickly and unlawfully killed or seriously
injured. 6 The other alternative is to cooperate in a criminal act where no
innocent life would be at stake. Legal policy must surely hold it to be
unreasonable to act so as to foreseeably induce an immediate mortal assault
on an innocent person if a feasible alternative would avoid unlawful threat
to life. 47 Thus, in the context of coercion as a defense to a criminal charge,
the conditions of the classic coercion test, taken jointly, entail that in the
eyes of the law the victim had no reasonable alternative48 to compliance.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 9(g) & 11.
46. It is assumed that the law does not require the citizen to act heroically, and so heroic
defiance is not, in law, to be considered a "reasonable alternative," i.e., one that a citizen is
required to entertain, and indeed to prefer, in this context.
47. See supra text accompanying note 9(e).
48. This principle is obviously a narrower version of the principle underlying the defense
of Necessity. Because it is a special form of that general principle, and because the general
principle of Necessity as a defense has long been accepted in the common law, the narrower
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It may appear that the word "fear," so commonly used in the formu-
lation of the test,49 introduces an essential psychological component. The
word in this usage, however, need connote no more than "apprehension," 50
that is, expectation of undesired consequences. The legal issue here is not
the presence of enotion' but the foresight of legally relevant consequences.
Plainly, a person whose conduct and circumstances meet the legal test for
coercion would be entitled to the excuse even if, as a result of prior experience
or of natural temperament, the defendant had not experienced fear. Such a
person might comply cooly and calmly because, being the only way to avoid
death, compliance was the only reasonable alternative.
Given the victim's innocence5 2 the other side of the coin is that the
coercer's threat must be unlawful. In the informal idiom examined in the
formulation is also valid. However this is by no means to say that, in general, coercion should
be viewed as a species of Necessity. See infra note 54.
49. Thus in R.L Recreation Center v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the court formulated
the "well established" rule that coercion must produce a "well-founded fear." 177 F.2d 603,
605 (1st Cir. 1949). Similarly, in Gillars v. United States, the court referred to "the force and
fear" essential to coercion. 182 F.2d 962, 976 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Also, quite typically of
the courts in defining coercion, the same two courts use the word "apprehension" apparently
interchangeably with the word "fear."
50. See supra note 49.
51. Obviously there is a connection: The taking of life is proscribed so stringently by law
because it is so grave a harm; and because it is so grave a harm, it does typically arouse fearful
emotion. To feel fearful emotion under such circumstances typically is reasonable. No doubt it
is the painfulness of the emotion, and the reasonableness of this under the circumstances that
are principal reasons inspiring the acceptance of the basic legal principle that the unlawful
taking of innocent human life belongs to the gravest category of criminal offense. Nevertheless,
that legal principle suffices, in the context of law, to ground the excuse, and the subjective
experience of emotion becomes irrelevant or only indirectly relevant. It becomes a crime in law
regardless of any subjective fear felt or not felt. Correspondingly, the element of emotion is
not an essential element of the classic legal test of criminal coercion; it is the unlawful placing
of life at risk that is legally crucial.
In a spirit that may appear contrary to this, the English Law Commission in its 1977
discussion of duress, said, "It is difficult to see how the proper test in regard to the defendant's
belief as to the nature of the threat could be other than a subjective one." REPORT ON DEFENCEs,
supra note 9(a), at 3. The Report stresses at a later point that "[threats directed against a
weak, immature or disabled person may well be much more compelling than the same threats
directed against a normal healthy person." Id. at 10. This all suggests that the subjective
emotion of fear, contrary to the thesis of the text above, is of the essence in establishing the
defense of coercion. But careful examination of the language of the Report reveals that it
contains the same ambiguities found ubiquitously in the case law on coercion. Are we to
suppose that coercion is a subjective, emotion-driven incapacity to resist, or is it that evidence
showing that the defendant was "weak, immature or disabled" might go toward proof that the
defendant did take at face value, as a "threat of death," what a "normal, healthy person"
might have been able to confront and resist. See infra text accompanying notes 94-99 (discussion
of subjective element that may be relevant to determining "apparent reasonableness").
52. It bears emphasis that the assumption in the preceding analysis of the victim's
"innocence" is not to be taken in the sense that the defendant is presumed not guilty of the
crime charged, for that would be to beg the very question posed by the defense. See supra note
9(a). The point is, rather, that the defendant did not culpably (e.g., through prior criminal
participation or through recklessness) get into the position of vulnerability to such threats.
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preceding section, the choice before the victim must be "unfair." The
wrongfulness of the coercer's act is obvious and taken for granted, and the
legal test of coercion in the criminal defense context is thus silent on the
issue. After all, use of the coercion defense entails the claim that the coercer
demanded commission of the criminally prohibited act. Only in rare and
esoteric borderline cases53 would one find even the arguable possibility that
a person could lawfully threaten a person and demand that the person
commit a criminally prohibited act. Moreover, as we shall see, the require-
ment of wrongfulness on the part of the coercer is made more explicit in
other legal contexts, perhaps simply because it is not always true in those
contexts that threatening demands need be unlawful.1
4
53. See supra note 42 (discussing O'Sullivan v. Fisher and related cases).
54. It has been proposed that the coercion defense is a species of Necessity defense, an
assumption that would fundamentally de-emphasize the significance of the wrongfulness of the
threat. See G. WILAMS, CRIMINAL LAW, THE GENERAL PART 755 (2d ed. 1961). But see G.
WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 578 (between 1961 and 1978, Professor Williams changed his view
to where coercion seems to be treated as a kind of ad hoe variant of Necessity.) Not infrequently
the terms "coercion" and "necessity" are conjoined and treated as if they were essentially the
same. See, e.g., Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962, 976 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1950); R.I.
Recreation Center v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (Ist Cir. 1949). Perkins
seems to assimilate the two defenses in their fundamentals: "[A]ny threatened harm, whether
by man or by the elements, which would have induced a person of reasonable firmness to do
what [he] did, should be recognized as an excuse." R. PERKINs, supra note 1, at 960. LaFave
& Scott also say that "[ilt would doubtless be possible to treat [coercion] as a branch of the
law of necessity." W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 383. See Cross, supra note 21.
Gardner notes that "[t]he doctrine of necessity is poorly developed in Anglo-American juris-
prudence." Gardner, supra note 9(0, at 114. He adds that the "paucity of common law
decisions and legislative effort devoted to it has led courts that do discuss the doctrine to
disfavor the widespread application." Id.
On such a view, wrongful threat would merely be a familiar and common feature of
certain types of Necessity, those types that have been given the separate name of coercion. The
aspect of wrongfulness would logically add nothing essential to the legally excusing force of the
plea. The essence of the matter, on the view that coercion is a form of Necessity, is that the
defendant's act reasonably appeared to risk less harm than any available alternative. Whether
this be due to someone's wrongful conduct or not is irrelevant.
It is notable that the Necessity defense, although long recognized in legal theory, has
never succeeded in England. See REPORT ON DEFENCES, supra note 9(a), at 20. The Report
expresses doubt whether any such common law general defense even exists in English law. See
id. In the United States, its fate has not fared much better. See J. HALL, supra note 1, at 425-
36 (discussion of "teleological necessity"). Hall says that while the doctrine in English law is
in "an unsatisfactory condition," that is, not recognized by the courts but advocated by many
commentators, it is "recognized in the substantive law of the United States." Id. at 433. On
the other hand, he cites no United States cases where a defense of what he calls teleological
necessity (i.e., choice of lesser evil) was in his opinion unambiguously and rightly the basis of
acquittal. Perkins cites the three cases viewed with suspicion by Hall, but definitely assigns
them as successful uses of the necessity defense. See R. PERKINS, supra note 1, at 956. However
Perkins, unlike Hall, seems to accept the principle that necessity should not be an excuse for
killing an innocent and unoffending person. Perkins does cite cases, and defends the result,
where necessity is not posed by mortal dangers but is posed by much less portentous choices
among evils; the cases are few, however. As LaFave & Scott point out, where the legislature
has itself, in its statutes, made determinations of value, the statutory determination has force.
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Before proceeding to an analysis of coercion in other legal contexts, we
may summarize the results of the discussion of the criminal defense by saying
that coercion as a defense to a criminal charge requires at least that:
See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 382. LaFave and Scott also note that the cases
on point are not numerous. Id. at 383. The Model Penal Code provides for a defense of
Necessity in § 3.02; and the pertinent comments to Tentative Draft No. 8 (1960) remark on the
paucity of cases.
In recent years the necessity defense has been attempted unsuccessfully in cases of
politically motivated offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515, 517-18 (8th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 700-01 (8th Cir. 1972). However, there has
been occasional success at the trial court level in connection with prosecutions of "de-
programmers" who forcibly kept religious converts under their control while "de-programming"
them; yet the same defense, in regard to much the same circumstances, has been rejected in
other such cases. See United States v. Patrick, No. Cr-74-320-S (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 1974)
(defense allowed); People v. Patrick, No. N-320-778 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Mar. 30, 1973) (defense
allowed); People v. Patrick, 541 P.2d 320, 322 (Colo. App. 1975) (defense rejected); People v.
Florence, No. 8699, People v. Patrick, No. 8688, People v. Sacks, No. 8686 (Fullerton, Cal.
Mun. Ct. May 6, 1975) (defense rejected). In connection with de-programming and the necessity
defense, see Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the First
Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 83-85 (1977). It should be noted that in the defense of
necessity to a forcible de-programming charge, the "greater evil" that the defendant was
avoiding was not a natural event, but was an alleged wrongdoing by human beings.
The classical accounts of Necessity contrast it with duress by stressing that the choice of
evils constituting Necessity arises out of natural events, whereas the choice in duress arises
because of another human being's wrongful threat. Yet the de-programmer's defense is plainly
not one of duress. This brings out that the true distinction between duress and Necessity is not
based on the human or non-human origin of the dilemma, but instead is a distinction between
Necessity as a choice-of-evils defense-where one of the evils might involve human conduct,
and even human wrongdoing, but where the defendant was not being Victimized-and a
Victimization defense (of which duress is a species). See infra text at section III. Plainly the de-
programmer faces a dilemma caused by human conduct, which also happens to be alleged
wrongdoing, but the de-programmer is equally plainly not the one who is wronged-not a
Victim. See infra text accompanying notes 171-72. The meaning and rationale of these two
types of defenses are very different. The defense of Necessity has also been used in recent years
in connection with prison escapes. See infra text beginning just prior to note 159.
Duress and coercion, on the other hand, have been far more frequently invoked than
Necessity, and what is more, often successfully so. In fact the courts have shown increasing
sympathy for the duress defense in modern times, and have tended to enlarge rather than to
restrict its scope. There is no good evidence that this disparity in use arises because situations
of coercion are relatively common as compared to (noncoercion) situations of Necessity. Instead,
the moral to be drawn seems to be that in the eyes of the law there has consistently been
something systematically significant, and more forceful, about a plea of excuse for a criminal
act motivated by a danger to the actor that was designedly created for that very purpose by a
wrongful human threat, i.e., Victimization, as contrasted with a defense based merely on the
actor having faced a choice-of-evils dilemma. English commentators have been more explicit in
affirming that there is a significant difference than have commentators in the United States.
Thus, the English Report on Defences explicitly proposes keeping the duress defense, and even
liberalizing its terms in some respects as compared to common law concepts. See REPORT ON
DEFENCES, supra note 9(a), at 16. The Report, however, suggests that the Necessity defense has
dubious authority, and ought to be explicitly excluded from the Criminal Code. See id. at 32.
Williams argues that duress should not be viewed as simply a particular application of the
doctrine of necessity. See G. WILLUAMS, supra note 1, at 579. While none of the arguments
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(a) There is an innocent victim-i.e., one who innocently became
vulnerable to
(b) a coercer who wrongfully confronted the victim with a mor-
tal threat and a demand, and
(c) the victim, in response to the threat, complied with the
threatener's demand because compliance was the only reasonable
course.
B. Economic Coercion
"Economic coercion" is a legal rubric that covers many types of situa-
tions. In general, a party to a business transaction, if that party was coerced
into the transaction, can avoid or be excused from ordinary legal conse-
quences of such a transaction, for example, can have payments returned, or
commitments voided. 55 We will consider a selected sampling of types of
economic coercion.
above are those offered herein, they do support the general proposition in the text above to the
effect that there has been and remains a persistent resistance to the necessity defense, and a
consistent willingness to accept the duress defense, which taken jointly suggest a legally
significant difference, practical as well as conceptual, between the two concepts. See Gardner,
supra note 9(f), at 114 (speaking of courts as having "disfavored [the] widespread application"
of the necessity defense). The conclusion that the wrongful threat intended as a motive for the
act is central and essential rather than secondary in the context of the coercion defense is
confirmed when one considers the tests of coercion in other legal contexts such as those discussed
below in the remainder of this section.
55. Although the present study is not historical in its aim, it at least deserves note here
that economic duress was not until modern times so broad in scope as stated in the text above.
In both England and the United States, courts of equity had increasingly recognized over time
what was called "duress of goods" as distinguished from "duress of the person." But by the
20th century the scope of duress had expanded in United States law to cover many forms of
business and property interests. See Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45
MICH. L. Rav. 253 (1947) (excellent historical survey); see also Sistrom v. Anderson, 51 Cal.
App. 2d 213, 124 P.2d 372 (1942); 13 WILLISTON ON CoNT ACTS § 1602 (3d ed. 1957); Schwatka,
Economic Duress and Business Compulsion in California, 40 CAL. L. REv. (1952); Annot. 77
A.L.R. 2d 803 (1959); Annot. 20 A.L.R. 2d 736 (1950); Annot. 75 A.L.R. 654 (1931). The
development of analogous law in England seems to have been much slower. It was foreshadowed
by Astley v. Reynolds, 93 Eng. Rep. 939 (1731), Parker v. Great Western Railway Co., 135
Eng. Rep. 107 (1844), and Maskell v. Homer, [19151 3 K.B. 106. These were not taken up
vigorously until the past few decades, which have seen a strong movement toward a broad
doctrine of economic duress akin to that of the United States. See Rookes v. Bernard, [1964]
A.C. 1129 (H.L.); D. & C. Builders Ltd. v. Rees, [1966] 2 Q.B. 617 (C.A.); North Ocean
Shipping Co. v. Hyundai Constr. Co., [1979] 1 Q.B. 705; Pao On v. Lau Yiu Long, [1979] 3
All E.R. 65; The Siboen & the Sibotre, [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 293 (Q.B.-Comm. Ct.). Dawson
argues that the main function of duress doctrine has always been economic-"the prevention
of unjust enrichment." Dawson, supra, at 282. But this plainly seems to be an overgeneralization.
While the prevention of unjust enrichment is often substantively central, it is in many cases not
even relevant because money or valuables are not at issue even though duress is. For example,
there is no question of unjust enrichment when coercing a person into doing a criminal act such
as aiding in an assault or rape, or committing perjury, or treason. And in modern law, coercion
may play a legal role, for example in adoption proceedings or confession to crime, where again
unjust enrichment need have no role.
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The first kind of economic coercion, and probably the one that most
sharply contrasts with coercion as a criminal law defense, is coercion in
which corporate or governmental entities rather than individual persons are
the parties in litigation. In Great Northern Railway Co. v. State,5 6 the Great
Northern Railway Company (Company) paid a tax that it thought was
unlawfully imposed.17 The tax statute provided that failure to duly pay the
tax would trigger automatically and immediately certain penalty provisions
which would in fact have interrupted the Company's use of its property and
the operations of the railroad itself.58 Rather than refuse to pay the tax and
suffer major economic loss that would for all practical purposes be irreme-
diable, even if some appropriate subsequent legal action were successful, the
Company paid the tax under protest.5 9 The Company then sued for redress
on the ground that payment had been coerced 0 The court found that the
Company had been correct in claiming that the tax had been unlawfully
imposed. 6' In consequence, said the court, an essential condition of coercion
had been present: the State's demand for payment was wrongful.6 2 Moreover
the court agreed that because of the irremediable large-scale economic impact
that would result from the automatic penalty provision, no reasonable
economic or legal alternative to paying the wrongfully imposed tax existed. 63
The court declared, therefore, that the claim of coercion was justified, and
the Company was entitled to the return of the tax paid. 4
It should be noted at the outset that the legally relevant issues here are
patently not psychological or "subjective." So far as the law was concerned,
there were essentially two interrelated sets of issues, those centering on the
legal wrong, and those centering on the reasonableness of the alternatives
available to the Company. The issue of reasonableness raised objective
questions of economics and of law, questions of corporate profit and loss,
of the legality of the demand for tax payment, and of the availability of
legal redress under a variety of different payment or no-payment conditions.
This confirms our previous emphasis on the issues of wrongfulness and
reasonableness as of the essence in coercion.
On the other hand, the court's opinion gives no clue as to the personal,
psychological reactions or emotions of the corporate officers because, of
56. 200 Wash. 392, 93 P.2d 694 (1939).
57. 93 P.2d at 699-700.
58. Id. at 704.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 699.
61. Id. at 703.
62. Id. at 706 (quoting Thompson v. Deal, 92 F.2d 478, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1937)); id. at 707
(quoting Cox v. Whelcher, 68 Mich. 263, 36 N.W. 69 (1888)).
63. Id. at 706.
64. "[D]uress may sometimes be implied when a payment is made or an act performed
to prevent great property loss or heavy penalties when there seems no adequate remedy except
to submit to an unjust or illegal demand and then seek redress in the courts." Id. (quoting with
approval the Supreme Court of Wisconsin).
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course, such reactions were legally irrelevant. Thus our earlier rejection of
the issue of psychic stress and trauma as not of the legal essence in coercion
claims is thoroughly substantiated in this economic context. Nevertheless, it
is not atypical that the court, even in a case of this kind, invokes the rhetoric
of the "broken will." "The coercive purpose and effect," said the court,
"was amply sufficient to break down the resistance .... There was a yielding
to compulsion .... 6 The language is "psychological"; the substantive issues
are not.
The leading case of Young v. Hoagland66 expresses a pertinent general
rule in economic coercion:
[W]here, by reason of the peculiar facts a reasonably prudent man
finds that in order to preserve his property or protect his business
interests it is necessary to make a payment of money which he does
not owe and which in equity and good conscience the receiver should
not retain, he may recover it.67
Here again the issues are defined in terms of reasonable business calculations
and inequitable (wrongful) demands, no reference being necessary to inner
psychic ordeals, stresses, or breakdown.
But not unexpectedly, the Young v. Hoagland court also discusses the
issues in terms of a "threat to perform some unlawful act whereby plaintiff
will suffer loss, [thereby inducing] the plaintiff, under circumstances suffi-
cient to control the action of a reasonable man, to pay money which he
would not otherwise have paid." 68 Here the phrase "control the action"
suggests that the issue is one of psychological causation. But the sense of
that phrase becomes ambiguous because it is "the action of a reasonable
man" that is controlled, not the plaintiff's action. Presumably what "con-
trols" reasonable men is by definition the reasonableness of the act, not
inner breakdown or mere subjective emotion. So here, as in so many other
similar instances,6 9 what looks like a comment about psychological causality
65. Id.
66. 212 Cal. 426, 298 P. 996 (1931).
67. 212 Cal. at 431.
68. Id.
69. "Duress does not necessarily mean force or personal fear, but rather that pressure of
circumstance which compels the will of man to yield to an exaction or payment to release his
property from some illegal hold upon it." Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Velez, 285 F. Supp. 123, 125
(D.P.R. 1968). Again we see the rhetoric of the will "compelled to yield," and of psychological
causality, and we sense the background imagery of the armed extortionist. At the same time
other language in the formulation, as well as the facts in the case, reveal that in this case we
are dealing with a highly impersonal business transaction between Alcoa Steamship Company
and their Puerto Rican insurance company, a transaction in which, as in Great Northern
Railway, 200 Wash. 392, 93 P.2d 694 (1939), the only relevant issues are economic calculation
and legal analysis. The Alcoa opinion explicitly rejects necessity for "personal fear", whereas
Sistrom v. Anderson casts the issue in such terms as: "Coerced by fear of a wrongful act by
the other party." See Sistrom v. Anderson, 51 Cal. App.2d 213, 124 P.2d 372 (1942). In the
economic context, it is easier to see that "fear," in its essential relevant meaning, connotes
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becomes, when cashed in, a statement about the act's normative status under
legal standards of wrongfulness and reasonableness.
The issues may become somewhat more complicated, although not
changed in their essentials, when the victim of a wrongful threat is an
individual rather than a corporate entity. This is especially so if that
individual's legally cognizable interests in the transaction are not solely
economic. Where individuals are economically coerced, personal or domestic
interests may also be legally cognizable as interests at stake, and this is more
likely to be so if the individual that is victimized is an individual who is not,
as it were, "in business." It is for the court to define the bounds of the
transaction and the nature of the interests at stake in the eyes of the law.
Thus, in Leeper v. Beltrami,70 Leeper's personal home was threatened
with foreclosure and sale if she did not make a payment wrongfully de-
manded. The court found coercion, holding that it was "not a reasonable
alternative" for Leeper to assert her rights by rejecting the wrongful demand,
if to do so she had to allow her home to be sold forthwith, and then
subsequently had to sue for money redress. 71 The court recognized as a
legally relevant interest the unique personal value of one's own home, a
value not reasonably translated into future money damages in the context of
resisting wrongful demands. 72 By contrast, there is in London Homes Inc.,
v. Korn" a very different legal definition of the interests legally relevant for
purposes of assessing reasonableness. In London Homes, a large-scale shop-
ping mall development company was faced with what seemed a wrongful
demand by a lessee.74 Compliance would have allowed normal progress
toward completion of the project, and prompt financial returns on the large
investment. 7" Litigation along with refusal to comply, however, would have
entailed a delay of years, with continuing costs and no return on investment.
7 6
The developer gave into the demand, then sued for redress on grounds of
coercion. 77 The court held that it is a normal risk in such business enterprise
merely a reasonable anticipation of an economically undesirable result. See supra notes 49 &
51. In economic coercion as in the criminal defense of coercion, the reasonableness of the
victim's act presupposes the absence of any reasonable alternative: It "is undoubtedly the law"
that "if the plaintiffs had a reasonable alternative [to compliance], the [compliance] was not
made under duress." Louisville Title Ins. Co. v. Surety & Guar. Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d 781,
801, 132 Cal. Rptr. 63, 77 (1976); Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 204, 347 P.2d 12, 19, 1
Cal. Rptr. 12, 19 (1959). The implication is plain: Even if company A makes a wrongful demand
on company B for payment, and even if this arouses intense emotions in company B's executive
officer that leads him to comply, this is not legally coercion. It is of the legal essence to
determine whether there existed a reasonable economic-legal alternative to a wrongful demand.
70. 53 Cal. 2d 195, 347 P.2d 12, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1959).
71. 53 Cal.2d at 205.
72. See id.
73. 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1965).
74. 44 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
75. See id
76. See id.
77. Id. at 265-66.
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that there may be difficult business dealings, and occasion for litigation and
the accompanying costs. 78 Here we see that, in contrast to the risk to Leeper's
personal home, the losses attendant on litigation were reasonable from the
standpoint of the law as a cost of defending the corporation's economic
rights.
Although the claim of coercion in London Homes was rejected, the
court did acknowledge that "within the common or every-day meaning of
the words" there was "a kind of necessity or compulsion to get things done
immediately.... ,79 Here we see clearly that "reasonableness" is a legal norm,
in the sense that the court decides definitively what interests are legally
relevant to assessing reasonableness, and definitively determines their weight.
The court also determines what interests that may be legitimate from other
perspectives are not to be considered as relevant for the legal purposes at
hand. In doing so, the court may take into account the norms of common
economic practice, or of domestic customs and values, or of moral aspects
of the affair.8 0
It deserves emphasis for our purposes that while economic, domestic,
moral, or other extralegal norms may be substantively incorporated into the
78. Id. at 267.
79. Id.
80. See White v. State, 44 Ohio App. 331, 185 N.E. 64 (1933) (abandoning wife without
just cause is not per se legally punishable, but is wrongful enough to constitute general mens
rea for crime of abandoning pregnant wife, even though defendant did not know of pregnancy).
The classic cases here are the statutory rape and analogous offenses. Even in the non-negligent
absence of knowledge of the female's age or status, the general mens rea required for violation
of statutes prohibiting sexual intercourse with such females has been widely held to be present
by reason of the wrongfulness, even where not in itself unlawful, of non-marital sexual
intercourse. See R. v. Prince, (1875) 13 Cox C.C. 138, [1874-80] All E.R. Rep. 881; see also
Annot., 8 A.L.R. 3d 110 (1966). The law bearing on unconscionability in economic matters is
notably replete with cases in which what the court declares to be wrong is conduct incompatible
with contemporary norms of fair business dealing rather than a specific illegal act. See Patterson
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d Il1 (D.C. App. 1971); Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J.
522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971); UNIFORM COMMERCIA. CODE § 2-302 (1962) (Purposes). "The act or
threat upon which a claim of [economic] coercion is predicated must only be wrongful in a
moral sense, not necessarily a legal one." Gerber v. First Nat'l Bank, 30 Ill. App. 3d 776, 779,
332 N.E. 2d 615, 618 (1975). "[W]e think [the contract] is too hard a bargain and too one-
sided an agreement to entitle plaintiff to relief in a court of conscience.... We are not suggesting
that the contract is illegal...." Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948).
Recent successful defenses in prison escape cases also furnish patent examples of the tacit
importation of moral norms into legal reasoning. The defense requires that there have been no
reasonable alternative to escape. See infra section III (discussion of prison escape). If acquiescing
to homosexual demands were not so freighted with negative moral value in the mind of the
court as well as that of the defendant, surely the defense would be implausible. Imagine, for
example, that the threats of the other prisoners were to brutalize or kill the defendant unless
the defendant submitted to having his hand held for an hour. Obviously, although this too is a
demand for bodily submission, it does not have the moral connotations of bodily submission
to homosexual intercourse, even if the latter were accompanied by no physical injury or pain
at all. But while the demand for handholding would surely not establish an excuse for prison-
escape, it is the moral import of unwillingly submitting to the sexual embrace that makes this




law on the case, they acquire their legally normative force by reason of a
legally authoritative decision, and only insofar as that decision does ascribe
legal force to them. Presumably, the reasons for this legal decision are rooted
in legal principle and in legal policy. Thus, in characterizing as "legalist"
the present approach to coercion (and ultimately to Victimization), it is not
claimed that all considerations of psychology, morality, custom, or other
extra-legal norms are totally excluded. Rather, the point is that such extra-
legal considerations become relevant only occasionally, and always have their
normative force derivatively from law. Analogous distinctions can be made
in many other areas. For example, a medical view of diet is significantly
different from a culinary view of diet, although the former may on occasion
take culinary facts and norms of taste into account. The medical authority
decides on medical grounds, however, which culinary considerations will be
given medical support for medical purposes, and which culinary considera-
tions will be ignored or even overridden. It is not merely a "verbal" matter,
then, that in occasionally recognizing certain economic or moral norms in
regard to coercion, a court does so from a "legalist" standpoint.
Now we are in a position to appreciate how it is true in some types of
cases that individual psychological processes and traits may be legally relevant
to determining whether there is economic coercion. For example, in Wise v.
Midtown Motors,81 the plaintiff had been asked to sign a release of an action
against a former employer, and was threatened with dismissal from his
current job and with heavy litigation expenses if he refused to sign the
release.8 2 Unable to contact his lawyer, the plaintiff signed the waiver, and
later asked the court to invalidate the release on the ground that it was given
under coercion. 3
The Wise court emphasized that the former employer's threats were
wrongful 4 The court noted that while it is true that a mere threat to bring
a legal action, if made in good faith, is not wrongful and, therefore, "does
not constitute duress," it is wrongful to threaten another with demands and
litigation "where the purpose is not to enforce the demand, but rather by
exceeding the needs for enforcement thereof to so use legal process as to
oppress his adversary ....' '8S On the other hand, and with at least apparent
inconsistency, the court stated that "the test" [of coercion] is not the "nature
of the threats,"nor is it whether some hypothetical "person of ordinary
courage and firmness" would have complied.86 The test, the court indicated,
is the plaintiff's "state of mind"; 8 7 it is a subjective test. What, specifically,
was the crucial "mental state" that in the court's mind established coercion?
81. 231 Minn. 46, 42 N.W.2d 404 (1950).
82. 42 N.W.2d at 406.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 408.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 407.
87. Id.
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-It was that as a result of the corporation's having acted "oppressively,"
the plaintiff's free will had been overcome. 8
Turning from the ambiguous language of the court to the circumstances
of Wise, however, one sees that whereas the victim's "state of mind" was
declared to be of the essence, and the question of a victim's mental weakness
was in turn declared pertinent to his "state of mind," '89 the court's reasoning
about the specific facts did not dwell on the plaintiff's mental functions or
malfunctions, or on the strength or weakness of the plaintiff's will. Instead,
the court focused its attention primarily on the "oppressiveness" of the
defendants' actions, given this individual plaintiff's employment status (fired
from one company, threatened with loss of his current job), and his finances
(in "financial distress" and threatened with expensive law suits)P ° The court
also noted that although the plaintiff tried to get in touch with his own
lawyer, he could not; thus informed legal advice was not available during
the interview when he was directed to sign the waiver immediately.9' The
sum of the court's truly psychological comment amounted to saying the
plaintiff was "worried and under stress."
'92
What does all this add up to? The reference to plaintiff's mental
condition-"worried and under stress"-certainly does accord with the
model of coercion as a kind of psychic breakdown, but it hardly suffices to
establish it. Moreover, consideration of this fact would be unnecessary to
legally establish coercion if it were to be determined that from an objective
standpoint plaintiff had no reasonable alternative under the circumstances
but to sign. That is, the force of the plaintiff's argument would be unchanged
if we were to imagine him in the same situation but as being a person who
by temperament is not a worrier but typically unflappable in the face of
stress. Given his naivete, the lack of legal advice, and his domestic and
economic situation, the threats left him no reasonable course but to comply. 3
How is the stress on the importance of the plaintiff's "subjective" state
of mind by some of the courts to be explained? It is not sheer error; there
88. Id. at 408. See Pao On v. Lau Yiu, 3 W.L.R. 435, 456 (1979) ("coercion of his will
so as to vitiate his consent"); id. at 451 (the victim's consent was "not a voluntary act").
89. Wise v. Midtown Motors, 231 Minn. 46, -, 42 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1950).
90. 42 N.W.2d at 408.
91. See id. at 406. The plaintiff did manage to talk to another attorney on the phone,
one he apparently had never consulted before, who told him it would be "legal" to sign the
waiver. Id. See Mitchell v. C.C. Sanitation Co., 430 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (threat
to fire employee is unlawful where designed to force employee to surrender valid claim and
good cause of action).
92. See Wise v. Midtown Motors, 231 Minn. 46, -, 42 N.W.2d 404, 406 (1950).
93. "Duress does not necessarily mean force or personal fear, but rather that pressure of
circumstance which compels the will of man to yield to an exaction...." Alcoa S.S. Co. v.
Velez, 285 F. Supp. 123, 125 (D.P.R. 1968) (corporation's refusal to make unjustified payment
would have made it non-insured employer).
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is indeed reason for it, although that reason is much more indirect and non-
essential than the language suggests. In considering the plaintiff's decision
to sign the waiver, the court is concerned to a significant extent with the
reasonableness of things from the perspective of the plaintiff, that is, with
what will hereafter be called the "apparent reasonableness" of compliance.
Here "subjective" factors may play a legally relevant role. Some course of
conduct may understandably appear reasonable to a person who, although
without fault in the matter, has little business or legal experience and is
without access to professional help. The same course of action might, on
the other hand, appear plainly unreasonable to one who has had legal or
business advice or who is personally knowledgeable about the relevant
matters. Such "subjective" considerations are legally relevant to coercion.
The concept "appears reasonable" is, to use Justice Frankfurter's word
in a related context, an "amphibian. ' 94 It is by no means purely subjective
in reference. Not everything that subjectively seems reasonable to (the
individual) "appears reasonable" in law, because there is also an "objective"
dimension to the concept. The courts do set limits, "objective" constraints,
on the form and content of any assessment of reasonableness. One such
constraint, in the case of both economic and criminal coercion, is that the
coerced act may in law "appear reasonable" only if no available alternative
could reasonably be preferred. This is a strong and effectively restrictive
constraint.
There are other constraints as well. Thus, under the circumstances of
Wise-Mr. Wise being unsophisticated in such affairs, and in a subjective
state of mind that rendered him easily influenceable-it appeared reasonable,
within the meaning of the law, that Mr. Wise should sign rather than refuse,
lose his job, and be driven into bankruptcy. However, had he been a person
whose subjective knowledge and sophistication in such matters were greater,
a person fairly well aware of his legal rights and privileges, it might not have
appeared reasonable, in the legally relevant sense, to sign even if he were
subjectively fearsome and easily persuadable. Moreover, if his attorney had
been present and had flatly advised him that he need have no fear, and that
other, adequate recourse was available, then regardless of Mr. Wise's sub-
jective state of mind, only assuming he was mentally competent, it could not
have appeared reasonable, within the meaning of the law, to sign away his
valid claim and cause of action. 95
Likewise, if Mr. Wise had been persuaded to knowingly cooperate in
defrauding some third party, in order to realize substantial profits, no
evidence about the subjectively apparent reasonableness of this to him would
94. See infra text accompanying notes 132-35.
95. This would seem to be the implication of the universal coercion requirement that
there have been no reasonable alternative to the dilemma posed by the coercer. If plaintiff's
attorney had pointed out a reasonable alternative that actually existed, then in spite of fears
and willingness to comply, the plaintiff would not be able to meet the "no reasonable
alternative" test.
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make this, within the meaning of the law, an "apparently reasonable"
choice. Here the objective constraint on "apparent reasonableness," that a
violation of law cannot appear reasonable, 96 is decisive.
One cannot say beforehand all that will be pertinent to a judgment of
reasonableness. The concept has a distinctively legal role of a complex kind,
and the court must in the last analysis make that decision in the perspective
of the principles and aims of law, and of the facts of the case. In any case,
even where individuals rather than corporate entities are concerned, the
ultimate issue is the reasonableness of acts, not whether some psychological
power of the victim's mind was destroyed or crippled.
The preceding analysis of "appears reasonable" brings out in the eco-
nomic context something that is also true and important, although previously
undiscussed, in connection with coercion as a criminal defense. The test of
coercion as a defense requires that the threat be "well-grounded. ' 97 This
notion is akin to the concept "appears reasonable." The victim must
subjectively believe the threat to be well-grounded, that is, authentic, credible,
capable of implementation and intended to be implemented. Not any belief,
however, even if only based on fantasy-fear, will do. There is both a
subjective and objective dimension. What is well-grounded for a person of
very low intelligence may not be so for a person of very high intelligence.98
The exact interplay of the "subjective" and "objective" here, as in the case
of "apparent reasonableness," is complex; the possibilities are many and are
nowhere completely elucidated. This much may be said: The court will take
into account individual mental powers or weaknesses, particularly those not
culpably self-induced, that bear upon assessment of the threat. On the other
hand, the victim, given those powers, will be expected to use them, and will
also be held to some objective standards of judgment, even if those standards
are adapted to a person with such a mind. We must recall in this connection
that we are dealing, after all, with legally competent persons, since mental
incompetence would immediately shift the legal context and issues away from
coercion.99
Finally, turning again to economic coercion, it must be emphasized that
the courts are quite explicit that the coercer must have acted wrongfully.1°°
96. To say that the violation of the law "cannot" appear reasonable does, of course,
oversimplify. As was noted earlier, for example, it is reasonable in the eyes of the law to violate
a law under the conditions of criminal coercion. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
Furthermore, at least according to legal theory, it is reasonable to violate a law in a case of
Necessity. See supra note 54.
97. See supra note 9(b).
98. See id. (discussion in regard to English law).
99. See infra note 186 (discussion of this in relation to undue influence).
100. See LaBeach v. Beatrice Foods, Co., 461 F. Supp. 152, 156, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (use
of power, no matter how great the disparity, is not per se duress; there must be wrongful use
of power); Louisville Title Ins. Co. v. Surety Title & Guar. Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d 781, 805, 132
Cal. Rptr. 63, 80 (1976) ("wrongful act or bad faith which is a predicate to a right to assert
economic compulsion"); Sistrom v. Anderson, 51 Cal. App. 2d 213, 220-21, 124 P.2d 372, 376
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Absent wrongfulness, it is no matter if the defendant used methods such
that "within the every-day meaning of the words" the plaintiff suffered "a
kind of necessity or compulsion," 10' or that the defendant had made "threats"
that "might have induced a reasonable man to succumb,"' 0 2 or that a party
"has been deprived of the exercise of his free will and constrained by the
other to act contrary to his inclination and best interest.' ' 03 None of this is
duress if the "pressure" be not "wrongful."'0 4
Thus, in summary, we see that in economic coercion the general concept
is the same as in criminal coercion, although the criteria of application of
those concepts differ in the differing contexts. The shared general concept,
as so far developed, is not in essentials a psychological concept directed to
inner stresses or breakdowns. The shared concept is, instead, defined in
terms of first, the wrongfulness in the eyes of the law of a person's conduct
designed to induce certain conduct on the part of the victim, and second,
the (apparent) reasonableness of the victim's act in the circumstances.
Turning to the criteria of application of this general concept, we see that
one criterion of "reasonableness" shared by both the economic and criminal
forms of coercion is that, for purposes of establishing coercion, a victim's
act is reasonable only if no available alternative could reasonably be pre-
ferred. On the other hand, the criteria for assessing reasonableness diverge
in economic and criminal contexts when it is a question of the nature of the
harms relevant to the assessment. Specifically, the criterion of reasonableness
in the context of the victim's commission of a criminal act is that alternative
conduct would have led to a far graver criminally prohibited harm, that is,
grave injury or death of an innocent person. On the other hand, the context
of economic affairs calls for more complex and more indefinite criteria with
respect to the types of harm relevant in assessing reasonableness. Thus, it
must be found that alternative conduct on the part of the victim would have
led to economic loss that was more than a prudent person engaged in such
(1942) ("coerced by fear of a wrongful act"); Young v. Hoagland, 212 Cal. 426, 431, 298
P. 996, 998 (1931) (demand unjustified in equity and good conscience); Hyde v. Lewis, 25 Ill.
App. 3d 495, 501, 323 N.E. 2d 533, 537 (1975) (duress has been defined as a condition where
one is induced by a wrongful act or threat); Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 20 N.J. 359, -, 120
A.2d 11, 15 (1956) ("But the pressure must be wrongful, and not all pressure is wrongful.");
Annot., 79 A.L.R. 3d 598 (1975) (three basic elements in economic duress, of which one is
wrongful act of coercer). See also North Ocean Shipping Co. v. Hyundai Const. Co., [1979]
Q.B. 705, 3 W.L.R. 419, 428 ("wrongful threatened action").
101. London Homes, Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233, -, 44 Cal. Rptr. 262, 267
(1965).
102. Louisville Title Ins. Co. v. Surety Title & Guar. Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d 781, 806, 132
Cal. Rptr. 63, 80-81 (1976).
103. Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 57 N.J. Super. 278, 154 A.2d 625 (1959).
104. Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 20 N.J. 359, -, 120 A.2d 11, 15 (1956); Louisville Title
Ins. Co. v. Surety Title & Guar. Co., 60 Cal. 3d 781, 805, 132 Cal. Rptr. 63, 80 (1976)
("wrongful act" or act of "bad faith" is "predicate to right to assert economic compulsion").
See 13 NVMLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1602, at 651 (3d ed. 1957) ("result of some imminent and
morally or legally wrongful or unlawful act or threat").
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affairs would normally be expected to accept. And the threat, in addition to
being wrongful, must have credibly portended economic loss of a kind that,
in the light of legally cognizable norms and interests, the victim should not
fairly be called upon to risk. Thus, the criteria of wrong and of reasonable-
ness significantly diverge from the economic to the criminal defense context,
but the underlying general concept consistently focuses on the reasonableness
of a response to a wrongful threat and demand.
C. Coerced Confessions
Having explored the concept of coercion as used in both the defense to
crime and also in the claim of economic coercion, we turn now to a third
major area of its use, the claim that a confession to crime was coerced.
Immediately striking when making such comparisons from the perspective
of this inquiry are the radical differences in the criteria used when it is a
case of being coerced into doing a crime as contrasted with a case of being
coerced into confessing a crime. In both instances, it remains true that the
coercion serves as a basis of avoidance or excuse from the ordinary legal
consequences, either excuse from condemnation for the crime, or avoidance
of use of the confession as evidence of one's guilt.
Opinions that have dealt with the issue of coerced confession are
pervaded by the language of the overpowered, broken, or otherwise tyran-
nized and traumatized will." 5 This, as in other contexts of law, is declared
to be the essence of the matter.'0 Such language seems to work against a
tacit or background paradigm of torture-coerced confessions: One imagines
the excruciating pain and horror associated with the all too real and long
history of bodily torture and "third degree" methods of inquisition. The
"broken will" is the psychic reflection of the literally broken body. However,
along with this language, recent coerced confession cases are also, and
paradoxically, replete with disclaimers recognizing the obvious absence of
physical torture in the case at hand. As if too obvious to warrant discussion,
it is said that of course "beatings" and other such "gross abuses" need not
be present.10 7 We are assured that "coercion can be mental as well as
physical,"' 0 18 that coercive results can be achieved by "subtler devices" than
105. A classic compendium of such language is found in Justice Frankfurter's lengthy
opinion in Culombe v. Connecticut. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 576 (1961)
("overborne will"); id. at 576 ("drained capacity for free choice"); id. at 584 ("mind of an
accused...twisted until he breaks"); id. at 634 ("will was broken"). The same, and analogous
idiom, is found in cases discussed and cited infra in connection with coerced confession. See
infra notes 106-56 and accompanying text.
106. "The question in each case is whether a defendant's will was overborne at the time
he confessed." Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (1961); see Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 602 (1961) ("The ultimate test remains ...the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker?").
107. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S 385, 401 (1978).




the use of "ropes and a rubber hose," subtler even than "relay questioning
persistently, insistently" that ends in "subjugating a tired mind." 1 9
This is a rhetorical move not infrequently seen in the literature of
jurisprudence, philosophy, and theology. The conditions that originally gave
rise to the idiom and imagery (here the confession obtained by literally
breaking the body) are with bland reasonableness acknowledged to be absent,
but the language is retained. Now it is held to refer to an invisible, intangible,
and subtle counterpart (the "broken will" in an intact body). (Let those who
cannot see the emperor's new clothes admit it at their peril!) The postulation
of the invisible counterpart serves as the ground for taking the present case,
factually very unlike the originals, and assimilating it doctrinally to the
originals. The doctrine is important because it can then be applied to trigger
certain desired logical or legal consequences-excuse or avoidance. The cost
of this move is that while one may end up with the result one intuitively
wants, one also ends up with verbal incantations providing no real insight
and having no determinable application to the facts.110
Anyone who would take seriously the language in the Supreme Court
opinions that emphasizes the broken will in coerced confession should be
profoundly puzzled by the language of Brain v. United States,"' the 1897
109. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 574 (1961).
110. From this perspective it is interesting to take note of the tendency since Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), for the Supreme Court to abandon faith in making specific
factual determination of coercion in confession cases, and to move to procedural rules in the
manner of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), overruled, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
On the other hand, the latest move of the English courts, possibly because of a lack of
the elaborate exclusionary rules available as an alternative to the United States courts, has been
to acknowledge the inadequacy of the specific formulae hitherto used, and to return candidly,
for lack of better, to vague generalities. See R. v. Rennie, [1982] 1 All E.R. 385. Rennie holds
that the determination of voluntariness is "above all" a matter of "common sense" and of
applying the "spirit of the principle." Id. at 389. On the one hand, Lord Chief Justice Lane
remarks that if a confession were inadmissible because the interrogation engenders stress, or
leads the accused to hope for some advantage by confessing, "nearly every confession would
be rendered inadmissible." Id. "Very few confessions are inspired solely by remorse," remarks
Lord Lane. Id. at 388. Having thus in effect abandoned the rule turning on "fear of prejudice
or hope of advantage" in Ibraham v. R., [1914-15] All E.R. Rep. 874, 877, reaffirmed in
D.P.P. v. Ping Lin, [19751 3 All E.R. 175, Lord Lane offers no doctrinally specific substitute.
He does say that 'voluntary' means in ordinary parlance 'of one's own free will'," but this is
merely to invoke once again the classic phrase which, as we have seen, provides of itself no
specific guidance. See [1982] 1 All E.R. 385, 389. And he refuses to "complicate" matters by
use of such notions as "improper" or "inducement." See id. However the facts of Rennie, as
recounted by Lord Lane, are consistent with, indeed quite suggestive of, the theses of this
study. The interrogators told Rennie of evidence that they had, and that in fact would have
implicated his mother had he not confessed; but in the view of the trial judge and Lord Lane,
this was not done in a way designed to threaten or induce confession, but simply as part of a
factual narrative of the available evidence in the case. See id. at 387-88. In short, the substance
of the matter was that nothing was done that was improper in the context of English law, and
hence the unquestioned influence of the interrogation on Rennie, and the fears and hopes it
engendered, were not held to be coercive. See id.
Ill. 168 U.S. 532 (1897); see Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 621 (1896) ("inad-
missible if made under any threat, promise, or encouragement of any hope or favor").
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case so frequently cited as authority and quoted in argument. Brain says
that the statement of confession "must not be extracted by any sort of
threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence ...." (emphasis added)."
2
Brain rationalizes the transition from the dramatic psychological language
of the "broken will" to the legal prohibition against any improper influence,
however slight, by arguing that "[tihe law cannot measure the force of the
influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and
therefore excludes the [confession] if any degree of influence has been
exerted." "1
3
Such language shows that the Court was carrying out an elaborate verbal
manipulation. First, the Court re-interprets "coercion" so that it ultimately
rests on an invisible counterpart to the torture-broken limb, the counterpart
being an invisible and unnameable psychic process in which "the will" broke
as a result of external threats or violence. Then the Court can rationalize
avoiding the use of psychological tests in the legal context by declaring that
the phenomenon is so esoteric and inaccessible that relevant psychological
tests cannot as a practical matter be directly applied. Plainly, however, the
Court is intuitively persuaded that something is wrong; something is improper
and unacceptable about the confession; and it seems somehow akin to what
is wrong in the classical gun-at-the-head or torture-inquisition cases. But
wherein lies the similarity? The true answer is seen in Brain as if it were
merely an objective "substitute" test. We find this by combining the idea of
an "improper" influence with what is suggested in yet another phrasing in
Brain: "The rule is that...the proof... must be sufficient to establish that
[the accused] was involuntarily impelled [to confess] from causes, which the
law treats as legally sufficient to engender in the mind of the accused hope
or fear in respect to the crime charged....
In sum, then, the actual test (as distinguished from the verbal "test"),
is that there is coercion if "legally sufficient causes" for a decision to confess
are in any degree improperly employed. Thus, Brain ends up, in this devious
way, with a test that in substance expresses the legalist concept already
formulated here: There is coercion if the confession was elicited because the
interrogator acted wrongfully with the intent to make confession appear
reasonable (in some "legally sufficient" sense of that phrase).
Brain does expressly remark on the essential causal role of the wrongful
conduct by means of the clause: "[W]hen but for the improper influence he
would have remained silent." 5 This does raise a question of psychological
112. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897) (emphasis added). In modern Supreme
Court cases this test was rephrased as requiring that the confession be made "freely, voluntarily
and without compulsion or inducement [i.e., wrongful compulsion or inducement] of any sort."
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) (emphasis added).
113. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897).




causation, a factual question rather than one of law. On the other hand, the
psychological question as so framed does not ask whether the accused's will
was broken, destroyed, or even "overborne" in some less dramatic way.
Rather, putting all the conditions together, what is required is the legally
improper use of a legally sufficient cause, no matter how minimal that cause,
to induce confession or a decision to remain silent. Thus the person coerced
need not be "twisted until he breaks"; it is enough merely to tip an otherwise
balanced weighing of the pros and cons by the person being interrogated.
Examination of the fact situation in modern confession cases confirms
that it is indeed this substance of the Bram test which governs in practice,
and with a high degree of consistency, in the reasoning of courts, although
the rhetoric of the "broken will" is also likely to be indulged. Haynes'
confession, for example, was declared inadmissible, even though "secured
by so mild a whip as the refusal, under certain circumstances, to allow [the]
suspect to call his wife until he confessed. '" 6 (Notice the physical imagery
of the whip, with the disclaimer phrase, "so mild," that makes what used
to be a physical reality into an obscure metaphor.)
Some courts have emphasized that certain particular mental qualities,
for example, being "weak of will or mind," are relevant," 7 recalling similar
comments discussed in the context of economic coercion. But again, as in
the economic context, examination of the particulars reveals a different
picture. Thus Haynes, who had a substantial criminal record, was apparently
a "mature adult.. .of a least average intelligence.. .neither a stranger to police
techniques and custodial procedures nor unaware of his rights on arrest.""18
One must assume that it was police impropriety that was crucial here, rather
than Haynes' dependency on his wife." 9
Culombe, in the classic portrait painted by Justice Frankfurter in Cu-
lombe v. Connecticut,20 appears as one whose capacity for free choice had
been "drained" by a "suction process,"'' and whose will had in fact been
"broken" twice in one day.'22 The totality of the facts reported in the
opinions in Culombe does reveal him as a person of low intelligence who
for a period of days was subject to improper police restraints and induce-
ments to confess.2' For days he consistently refused to confess. 24 At last he
acquiesced. 2
116. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (referring to Haynes v. Washington).
117. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 251 (1957) (quoting with approval Stein v. New
York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953), overruled, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)); see
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (more general statement to this effect).
118. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 522 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting).
119. See id.
120. 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
121. Id. at 576; see Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) ("the suction process of
interrogation").
122. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 634 (1961).
123. See id. at 606-21.
124. Id. at 607-15.
125. Id. at 614-15.
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To say, however, that Culombe's will was "broken" or his capacity
"drained" seems quite the wrong language in which to characterize his
conduct. If we cast aside our stereotypes about persons of relatively low
I.Q., we see that the record tells us that in spite of improper police tactics,
Culombe was from the outset consistent and firm in his attitude, for days
acting on the view that he would do best not to talk. 2 6 Then, after pleas by
his family, he decided that the reasonable thing to do was to confess.12 7 He
then clearly stated that he wanted to make a clean breast of it all, and
followed through consistently thereafter on this decision. 1 2 This was plainly
a conscious, reasoned, and resolute new commitment. That there was police
impropriety designed to give him reason to confess is also plain, and that
the police thus did finally manage, by indirection, to make it appear
reasonable to him to change his mind, is all beyond doubt. 2 9 It is not the
improprieties that are in question here but the claim that Culombe was a
man who had been "drained" of some crucial mental capacity, or deprived
of its use. His decision was instead "the product of a deliberate choice on
his part."' 30 It is characteristic of the coerced confession literature, however,
that Justice Frankfurter should have used the traditional mentalistic idiom
of the "voluntariness" test,'3' translating into a kind of mental incapacity
language these legally crucial facts.
Justice Frankfurter also was aware, of course, of the objective, factual
content of "involuntariness" in this context, and that it was not merely a
psychological or subjective notion. In the attempt to find some resolution or
synthesis, he presents an analysis of the concept of "voluntariness" as an
"amphibian" that straddles the subjective and the objective.'3 2 He asserts
that the term "voluntariness" here has reference to the external circumstances
under which the confession was given, and also has reference to the "imag-
inative" and "largely inferential recreation...of 'psychological' fact," an
inferential process that is "inextricably interwoven" with legal standards.3
This formulation remains obscure, and must remain so when taken to refer
to external forces actually causing some hypothetical inner mental break-
down. However, it takes on greater intelligibility when "involuntariness" in
regard to confessions is viewed as a legally conclusory term, analogous here
to "coerced," and thus as representing a legal finding that the wrongful
external conduct had played a crucial role in making it appear reasonable to
confess. The tacitly included notion of "appearing reasonable" does straddle,
as we saw earlier, 34 the subjective and the objective, in that it may in some
126. See id. at 607-15.
127. Id. at 613-15.
128. See id. at 616.
129. See id. at 631-35.
130. Id. at 642 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Clark and Wittaker).
131. Id. at 603.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
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cases call for imaginative inference to "psychological facts" about what
appeared reasonable, but the "psychological facts" concern the deliberations
of a rational person, as we saw earlier, 3 ' and not the mental incapacitating
of that person.
It now becomes evident that the criteria for applying the concept
"reasonable" once again differ significantly in the coerced confession context
from the criteria used in the economic and criminal coercion contexts. Most
importantly, the "no reasonable alternative" requirement is not applicable
here. Culombe, for example, could hardly claim that no reasonably preferable
alternative existed. It was, prima facie, at least equally reasonable for him
to prefer silence.
One can see the reason for the difference in criteria in this way. In the
matter of confession to a crime, a citizen's basic liberty interests are at risk.
The "no reasonable alternative" criterion of the reasonableness of an act,
so plainly suitable where the coerced act is criminally prohibited, is too
demanding in this context where the coerced act is, after all, perfectly lawful,
and where the private citizen is pitted against improper state oppression
designed to induce the act.'
36
Not only does the confession context reveal how the criteria of coercion
can vary, it reveals that the operative general concept is itself wider than the
word "coercion" readily suggests. Bram, for example, speaks not merely of
threats but also of improper "promises."' 3 7 Furthermore, the extension of
"coercion" to include deception is also implicit in Brain when it speaks of
"promises" and "influence."' 3 Other confession cases speak of "induce-
135. See supra text accompanying notes 93-99.
136. In the case of coerced confessions a major complicating factor is the fact that the
wrongdoer is an officer of the criminal justice system. As reflected in "exclusionary rules," the
official status of the wrongdoer introduces an independent element that itself can warrant
relieving the coerced person from the burden of having the confession admissible as evidence
of guilt. Thus, it is arguable that the shift from confession produced by torture to confession
induced by "any improper influence". "no matter how slight," should be viewed as in substance
a shift from the inadmissibility of coerced confession to the inadmissibility of the fruits of
official wrongdoing. Viewed this way, the Brain test requirement that the person would not
have confessed but for the improper influence serves merely to establish the materiality of the
wrongdoing to the act of confession. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruled, United
States v. Leon, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 3425 (1984); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914), overruled, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886), overruled, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). It bears noting that the
transition from a subjective to an objective view of the coerced confession concept is reflected
in section IV of the Mapp opinion, in which the application of the exclusionary rule is explicitly
connected with the precedents on coerced confessions beginning with Brain. See Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). Once this shift of emphasis explicitly takes place, it presages such flat
rules as to an arrestee's rights in regard to police interrogation as are embodied in the Escobedo
and Miranda decisions. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964), overruled, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
137. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
138. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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ment." 3 9 Moreover, it is plain that in coerced confession, promises of
benefits, deception and trickery are among the common improper influences.
If promises of benefits, or deception, can be the basis of a "coerced"
confession, why cannot deceptive argument or a promise of benefits that
induces a person to commit a criminal act serve as the basis of a coercion
defense? Why is it that the legal test of coercion as a defense should require,
as it does, a threat? Is this limitation justifiable?
Using the general theses that have by now been formulated here, we can
logically justify the legal limitation of the coercion defense to threats, while
dispensing with that limitation in the context of confessions. Axiomatic to
such a justification is the principle that in the eyes of the law criminal acts
in general are unreasonable.' 4 The only thing that can make a criminal act
reasonable in a particular case is the threat that if the victim should refuse
to comply a graver crime would be committed. Thus, it follows that promises
or inducements (i.e., proffered benefits) could not make commission of a
crime reasonable under the law.'
4'
Turning from the question of proferred benefits to that of deception,
we see that in this connection, too, the actual legal content of the concept
of Bram's "improper influence" goes beyond what the word "coercion"
naturally suggests. Mincey v. Arizona142 seems to be a case where it was not
threats but misleading tactics that produced confession, although other than
this it is not clear how the Court meant to categorize the wrongful influence.
In Mincey, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, declared that Mincey's
"will was simply overborne."' 43 Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, declared on
the contrary that Mincey's "will was 'simply [not] overborne' by 'mental
coercion."' "44 The facts were that Mincey had been seriously wounded and
was in the hospital intensive-care unit, attached to life-support equipment
139. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) ("coercion or improper induce-
ment"); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 621 (1895) ("or encouragement of any hope or
favor").
140. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
141. Where economic coercion is at issue, the matter is less clear. Although the reported
cases generally allow one to avoid the question, because the alleged coercion can usually be
interpreted as a threat, nevertheless it is at least arguable that it would be coercive to make a
wrongful offer of a benefit to a businessman who had no reasonable alternative but to accept
(perhaps everything would be lost if the offer were refused). Probably other remedies in equity,
perhaps unconscionability, would be argued rather than coercion, and there also arise more
philosophical disputes as to whether such a proffered "benefit" amounts to a threat. See, e.g.,
Nozick, supra note 41, at 447-53. Of course in the economic context we also find deception, as
distinguished from direct offer of benefits or threats of losses. But, as will be seen when
deception in the case of coerced confession has been analyzed, the claim of deception in
economic matters does indeed fall under the general concept of Victimization as developed in
section II below. It is legal tradition rather than logic that treats economic deception as a quite
different legal category from economic coercion.
142. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
143. Id. at 401.
144. Id. at 409 (Renquist, J., dissenting).
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that included breathing apparatus hindering his speech. 14 He was weak,
depressed, in pain, and periodically either confused, in a coma, or falling
asleep. 46 Whenever Mincey was conscious, a police officer who remained at
his bedside put questions to him. 47 Mincey said that he did not want to be
interrogated, and asked for a lawyer, but to no effect. 48 The officer simply
persisted in asking questions when Mincey was alert enough. 49 After a time,
Mincey responded to some of the questions. 50
The trial court held the confession to have been voluntary. 5' The Arizona
Supreme Court affirmed. 5 2 The United States Supreme Court reversed. 3
Given the majority opinion's statement of the facts, one might have expected
the opinions to focus on Mincey's unsatisfied request to be allowed to remain
silent and to have an attorney; but this is not the issue on which debate
centered. Instead, the majority, and Justice Rehnquist in dissent, debated
whether Mincey's will had been "overborne."' ' 54 Justice Stewart, for the
majority, also posed a crucial variant of the test question: Was Mincey's
confession the "product of a rational intellect and a free will?'1 55 We do
not know whether Justice Stewart thought Mincey was less than rational, or
was rational but so debilitated that his will was weak and unfree, or some
complex combination of these. Without specifying further, the majority
opinion declares that it would be "hard to imagine a situation less conducive
to the exercise of a 'rational intellect and a free will' than Mincey's."' 56
Nevertheless, it does not seem that Mincey was either threatened or promised
benefits. In his weakened condition he was simply asked questions, and his
statements of unwillingness to answer were ignored.
One thing is clear about Mincey: It tells us that if the official by any
improper means makes it appear reasonable to confess, then even if remaining
silent also appeared reasonable, as it did, both subjectively to Mincey and
objectively, then the confession induced by the official's conduct was legally
coerced. In short, there is no implication that (coerced) confession has to
appear the only reasonable course, or that the wrongful conduct need be a
threat.
The general principle that seems to be at work here is that in cases where
deceptive or misleading tactics are used, and where the victim's act is in
itself lawful, the victim may have no apparent decisive reason to seek
145. Id. at 396.
146. Id. at 396, 399, 401.
147. Id. at 401.
148. Id. at 399.
149. Id. at 401.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 388.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 402.
154. Id. at 401-02, 409.
155. Id. at 398 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960)).
156. Id.
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alternatives to the victimizer's proposal. After all, the deceptive proposal or
invitation or request is made to appear not only reasonable but also lawful,
and the person innocently does nothing unlawful in complying. This contrasts
sharply with the coerced criminal act, where the compliant act is unlawful
and, therefore, requires per se that alternatives be sought and, if at all
reasonable, preferred. It also contrasts with what is seen in the economic
coercion context. For where a demand is accompanied by a wrongful threat,
such as the prospect of wrongfully imposed significant economic loss, this
normally will be a decisive ground for seeking reasonable alternatives, seeking
to avoid compliance. The axiom here is the corollary of the axiom that if
there is any reasonable alternative it is generally unreasonable to do wrong:
It is generally unreasonable to submit to wrong if there is a reasonable
alternative. Therefore, one who claims to have been confronted with a
demand accompanied by a perceptibly wrongful threat must show that no
reasonable alternative appeared-for if it had appeared that a reasonable
alternative existed, and if the actor had nevertheless complied, then it could
be inferred that the actor preferred compliance regardless of the wrong. In
short, the "no reasonable alternative" test of coercion properly applies to
the criminal defense and to those economic coercion cases where wrongful
threats are used, but it does not apply in confession cases or in economic
cases where there are deceptive tactics that conceal the wrong.
Having now made it explicit that the general concept requires the victim's
act to be a reasonable response to a wrongful influence, but that the criteria
change significantly in different contexts, we should recognize that the general
excuse-avoidance concept in question, when looked at for the way it works
rather than in the light of its derivation from legal doctrine on "coercion,"
embraces not only legal coercion of all kinds,1 57 but also would, seem logically
to embrace to varying degrees what is taken up in law under such rubrics as
"unconscionability," "undue influence," "deception," and "extortion."
With a modification to be introduced below, it will also embrace the
doctrinally confused defense currently widely used in prison-escape cases,
5 8
that is, those cases where the escape is motivated by the wrongful threats
157. It should be re-emphasized at this point that the legal concept of coercion is narrower
than (and in some other respects different from) the loose, everyday English notion of coercion.
See supra text accompanying note 41. Any use of threat, whether or not it is wrongful, may
count as coercion or as "coercive" in ordinary speech. The courts have recognized this
difference. See, e.g., Louisville Title Ins. Co. v. Surety Title & Guar. Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d
781, 806, 132 Cal. Rptr. 63, 80-81 (1976) (threat to exercise legal right may cause person to
"succumb" but is not coercion in law); London Homes Inc. v. Korn, 234 Cal. App. 2d 233,
- 44 Cal. Rptr. 262, 267 (1965) (recognizing that "business 'compulsion' within the common
or every-day meaning of the words" may exist even though there is not 'duress' within the
meaning of the law"). And the failure to appreciate this distinction undermines the main
argument of Hale, who treats any transaction in which the prospect of a deprivation or loss is
a factor as coercive, and as substantially equivalent to coercion in law. See Hale, Bargaining,
Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLuM. L. Rav. 603 (1943).
158. See infra text accompanying notes 159-71.
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and demands of other inmates. All amount to wrongful conduct designed to
make a certain course of conduct appear reasonable and thereby to induce
it, thus victimizing the actor. And as one reviews the road thus far travelled,
it seems more evident than ever that the drama and physical-mental trauma
associated traditionally with the notion of "coercion" have in fact misguided
legal attention and obscured the true unity in a concept of very wide scope.
To pursue this train of thought directly and expeditiously, we turn now
from critical analysis, type by type, of specific legal uses of the notion of
"coercion," and proceed on a more theoretical level to a straightforward,
precise formulation of a general and legal concept of Victimization, along
with brief remarks on those elements or aspects of it that call for explanatory
comment or justification.
III. VICTIMIZATION
The word "Victimization" is here given a restricted, technical use. In
ordinary use, Jones could be spoken of as a victim, or as victimized, if he
was knocked down by a robber who forcibly grabbed his money. In what is
here called Victimization, however, the Victim is induced to do something
by the Victimizer. It is of the essence that the Victimizer aims to work his
will not merely on the Victim but, specifically, through the will of the Victim.
And the Victim-act will constitute a legally defined act that ordinarily entails
certain burdens (obligations, losses, penalties, punishments, etc.). Thus the
Victim may have consummated a contract, or signed over title to property,
-or signed a legal waiver or consent form, or unlawfully damaged another's
property or injured another person. Where one of the Victimization claims
is made, the Victim, therefore, will acknowledge doing the act, that is, the
Victim will acknowledge that all the legal elements of the act were present;
but, because of having been Victimized into doing the act, the Victim asks
to be legally excused from legal burdens ordinarily entailed. To this end the
Victim will invoke such specific legal excuse or avoidance concepts as
"coercion," "deceit," or "undue influence," and will request, for example,
"restitution," "invalidation," "voiding," "rescission," or a "Not Guilty"
verdict.
The concept of Victimization is not proposed as a replacement for
traditional legal concepts such as those just mentioned. The latter can be
viewed as reasonable or at least the accepted traditional variant forms of the
generic Victimization concept; and they provide specific criteria for applica-
tion of the general concept.
The formal statement of the concept of Victimization will introduce
nuances that the analysis up to this point has not developed. The gist of the
concept, however, is that if someone innocent is led to do something because
it appears the reasonable thing to do, and if it appeared that way because
someone else wrongfully and intentionally manipulated the situation with the
design of influencing the innocent person's choice precisely by making it
appear that way, then the innocent person has been Victimized and deserves
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to be excused or relieved from legal burdens that the act would normally
entail. A more formal statement of these ideas is the following:
(1) A Victimizer is one who intends to elicit certain conduct from
another person (the intended Victim), and who, with this design,
sets about, by means that wrong the intended Victim, to do what
will make it appear reasonable for the intended Victim to engage in
that conduct.
(2) An intended Victim becomes an actual Victim (i.e., is Victim-
ized) if, having non-culpably gotten into the situation, the intended
Victim does what has been made to appear reasonable in that
situation as designedly arranged by the Victimizer, and does so
because of that apparent reasonableness.
(3) Insofar as a person has been Victimized into doing an act, the
Victim may be legally relieved of legal burdens normally entailed by
that act.
A. The Victimizer's Intent-and Excusable Prison Escape
The definition of Victimization has been formulated so as to leave it
open whether the Victim-conduct is in fact the conduct intended by the
Victimizer. The Victimizer may wrongfully create a certain reason for action
with the intent that it be the Victim's reason for acting in one way, whereas
the Victim, for that very same reason, acts in another way. This is what can
happen when prisoners Victimize a weaker prisoner.
A typical defense against the charge of escape from prison by a Victim-
ized prisoner may be conceived in the following way. One or more other
prisoners demand sexual submission and conjoin credible threats of dire
bodily injury for refusal to comply. The intent, of course, is that the
combination demand and threat will serve as sufficient reason for the Victim
to choose to comply. Those same conditions make it appear to the Victim'59
that "the only viable and reasonable choice available"' 60 is the choice to
make an escape from prison.
159. The "amphibian" character of the apparent reasonableness of the act has been
stressed in this context. See supra text accompanying notes 94 & 132. Speaking of the defendant's
belief as to the nature of the threats, the court in People v. Condley emphasized that the belief
must be an "actual belief" and also that there must be "a reasonable cause for such belief."
People v. Condley, 69 Cal. App. 3d 1008, 1011, 138 Cal. Rptr. 515, 522, cert. denied, 434 U.S.
988 (1977).
160. People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 827, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112 (1974). In
People v. Condley, the court emphasizes that this phrase plainly implies an "objective" test.
See People v. Condley, 69 Cal. App. 3d 1008, 1010, 138 Cal. Rptr. 515, 521, cert. denied, 434
U.S. 988 (1977). But unless they enter into new "reasonable man" flights of fancy, the courts
will have to abjure an objective standard based on what would be viable for the "reasonable-
man-as-prisoner," and will in some circumstances also have to take into account the personal
traits of the prisoner in estimating what was a "viable and reasonable choice."
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In such a case, and conformably to the formal definition as well as to
our intuition, it is correct to speak of the escapee as having been Victimized. 6
It also is formally and intuitively correct, and (with certain regulative
constraints as discussed below) legally correct, to say that the Victim, as
such, deserves to be excused from punishment for escaping prison for this
reason.
62
Puzzles have arisen as to how to characterize this situation in terms of
the usual legal terminology, puzzles on which "oceans of ink have been
spilled by the legal logicians.' ' 63 Some courts, with an eye on the threats of
brutality and assault, have viewed this defense as, in law, the excuse of
coercion. 164 But of course it significantly deviates from coercion as classically
understood, since the defendant was not obeying the commands of others.
Other courts, with an eye on this latter fact, hold that this cannot be
coercion, and instead these courts have viewed the defense as a species of
justification by Necessity. 65 Still other courts have taken a compromise view,
that the defense is "somewhere between" coercion and Necessity.'6 The
latter view provides no principled solution, but seems to be language that
licenses ad hoc formulation of a special defense for this special kind of
situation, as the courts have been doing in effect.
167
161. "The unlawful acts of the person under duress are attributed to the coercing party
who supplies the requisite mens rea and is liable for the crime." People v. Condley, 69 Cal.
App. 3d 1008, 1012, 138 Cal. Rptr. 515, 522, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 988 (1977). See People v.
Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 333, - , 5 Ill. Dec. 848, __ , 362 N.E.2d 319, 322 (1977).
162. The development of American law and the proliferating commentary in connection
with excuses for escape from prison because of unbearable conditions has been rapid and
significant in recent years. See Fletcher, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a
Justification or an Excuse for Escape?, 26 UCLA L. REv. 1355 (1979); Note, Prison Escape
and Defenses Based on Conditions, 67 CALi. L. Rav. 1183 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Prison
Escape]; Note, Intolerable Conditions as a Defense to Prison Escapes, 26 UCLA L. Rav. 1126
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Intolerable Conditions]; Note, Duress and the Prison Escape: A
New Use For an Old Defense, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1062 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Duress and
the Prison Escape]; Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 678 (1976); see generally United States v. Bailey, 585
F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (lengthy review of literature), rev'd, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
163. State v. Baker, 598 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Mo. App. 1980).
164. See, e.g., United States v. Michelson, 559 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1977); People v. Harmon,
394 Mich. 625, 232 N.W.2d 187 (1975); People v. Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 232 N.W.2d 184
(1975).
165. See, e.g., People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 831, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115
(1974); People v. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 5 Ill Dec. 848, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977); State v. Baker,
598 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. App. 1980). See also People v. Richards, 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 597 (1969) (defense of duress rejected because defendant's escape was not act complying
with demands of coercers).
166. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 412 (1980); id. at 410 ("Modern cases have
tended to blur the distinction between duress and necessity"); see State v. Baker, 598 S.W.2d
540, 543 (Mo. App. 1980); see also, Intolerable Conditions, supra note 162, at 114, 128, 132-
33.
167. In United States v.. Bailey, the Supreme Court staying with the duress-necessity excuse
as the rationale of the defense, rejected a third possible defense rationale-that there was
absence of an element of mens rea, i.e., the specific intent to escape confinement that was
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Viewed in terms of the concept of Victimization, no puzzles arise.
Moreover, the concept of Victimization and the assumptions associated with
it plausibly and systematically generate the very types of constraints, for
example, those laid out in People v. Lovercamp,6 s that have in fact been
placed on this plea, ad hoc, by courts.' 69 The reasonableness of a criminal
act, as previously noted, rests on the fact that it avoids much graver harm,
grave or mortal injury to an innocent person; from this it follows that escape
from prison cannot be reasonable if it entails injury or death to prison
guards or police.' 70 Moreover, the wrong done the Victim must be the reason
explicitly included in the statutory definition of the offense. See 444 U.S. 394, 408 (1980). The
Court overruled the District of Columbia's Circuit's holding that Bailey's intent was not
necessarily to escape but could have been to avoid injury or sexual attack. See id. at 408.
Viewing this as "quite unsupportable," the Court held in effect that all the elements of the
alleged act are acknowledged to be present where duress-necessity is the issue, and that essential
to that defense is evidence of further conditions, over and above the act, that excuse or justify
the act. See id. at 408. In the context of the main theses of the present article, this is a
noteworthy holding by the Court. For in the Victimization concept, as herein defined, a Victim
is one who acknowledgedly committed the act as legally defined, but did so in a context where
there were further reasons, over and above commission of the act per se, that warrant excuse.
This thesis, in turn, is pertinent to the specific account of the justification for legally excusing
those who have been Victimized. See infra text at section IV.
Fletcher argues that "the important preliminary question.. .is not which doctrinal label we
should use, but whether the principle requiring consideration of the evidence is one of
justification or excuse." Fletcher, supra note 162, at 1355. While this is not the place to enter
into an extended discussion of his analytical approach and the theory that develops out of it,
it is pertinent that Fletcher ends with proposals that conflict in several substantial respects with
the content and thrust of the Lovercamp and Bailey holdings. See id. at 1366-68. In contrast,
the Victimization concept developed herein leads essentially to the same results in prison escape
cases that Lovercamp and Bailey do. Moreover the Victimization approach is more conceptually
economical than Fletcher's approach in that a distinct third defense need not be established.
168. Lovercamp set out a test consisting of five criteria:
(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or
substantial bodily injury in the immediate future;
(2) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a history of
futile complaints which make any result from such complaints illusory;
(3) There is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts;
(4) There is no evidence of force or violence used towards prison personnel or other
'innocent' persons in the escape; and
(5) The prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities when he has attained
a position of safety from the immediate threat.
See People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 831-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (1974).
169. There have been differences among the courts as to the exact status of the five
conditions that Lovercamp requires. Some courts have accepted the substance of these conditions
as requirements. See, e.g., United States v. Bryan, 591 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1071 (1980); United States v. Boomer, 571 F.2d 543, 545 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 911 (1978). United States v. Bailey stresses that return to custody as soon as the coercion
has lost its force is an indispensable element of the defense. See United States v. Bailey, 444
U.S. 394, 412, 415 (1980). Other cases have viewed these conditions as relevant for assessing
the evidence as to necessity, but not as conditions specifically required as a matter of law. See,
e.g., People v. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 333, 5 Ill. Dec. 848, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977); State v. Baker,
598 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. App. 1980).
170. As required by condition No. 4., People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 832,
118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (1974). See supra note 168 (Lovercamp criteria).
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that made the difference, that tipped the scale in favor of the criminally
prohibited act.
Therefore, the escapee must establish that the threats, and not, for
example, the mere desire to escape custody, were the crucial motive for
escape. This, in turn, can most readily be established if the escapee returns
to official custody promptly after escaping the physical proximity of the
Victimizers.' 7' Thus, the newly-emerging defense conforms with the Victim-
ization concept and, it seems fair to say, reflects the tacit, intuitive use of
the concept to modify legal doctrine when the standard legal categories did
not fit the facts well.
B. To "Wrong" the Victim
Victimization requires that the Victimizer shall wrong the Victim. This
is a more narrowly specified version of the requirement than has yet been
mentioned; until this point the requirement has been formulated more
broadly, in terms of the Victimizer's acting wrongfully. Mere wrongful
conduct, however, might be no more than a wrongful act incidental to
influencing choice. Thus, if Jones overparks in the course of taking Smith
to lunch for some hard business bargaining, Jones has incidentally done
what is wrongful but has not wronged Smith. This obviously is not a form
of Victimization. Moreover, even if Jones' wrongful conduct is more than
merely incidental to making the bargain, that still may not be enough to
establish Victimization. The Victimizer must wrong the Victim. The fact that
Jones had to act wrongfully toward a third party, as a necessary step in
being able to make a persuasive proposal to Smith, does not make Smith a
Victim. Most specifically, the wrong to Smith must be at least part of what
makes the act in question appear reasonable: The relation between the wrong
and the reason for action is "internal." For example, in order to present
information to Smith that will make a certain act appear reasonable, it may
be essential for Jones to unlawfully invade a reluctant Smith's privacy. But
even if Smith is then persuaded to do as Jones says, Smith may be persuaded
for reasons given by Jones that are perfectly valid. In that case Smith is not
Victimized, even though he was wronged. The wrong done to him was not
itself, at least, a part of his reason for the act, that is, the wrong was
"external," not "internal," to what made the act appear reasonable. On the
other hand, when the wrongful threat is itself the threatened person's reason
for the act, the wrong to the actor is at least part of, is internal to, the
171. This requirement is emphatically imposed by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Bailey. See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 412 n.9 ("We decline to hold that.. .failure to return is 'just one
factor' for the jury to weigh.... [O]ur holding is a substantive one: [bona fide effort to surrender
or return is] an essential element of the defense...."). See also United States v. Michelson, 559
F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1977) (stressing that to excuse initial departure from custody is not to excuse
continued absence and thus in effect allow commutation of sentence); People v. Lovercamp, 43
Cal. App. 3d 823, 832, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (1974) (condition 5).
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reason for the act; indeed the wrongful threat is itself the reason for doing
the act.
172
C. The Reason for the Victim's Act
The definition of "Victim" requires that the Victim act "because of the
apparent reasonableness" that the act has as the result of the Victimizer's
conduct. This is intended to reflect the "but for" provision in Brain,'" the
idea that indeed it was the Victimizer's conduct that "made the difference."
Some such link seems necessary in the formula if we are to capture the sense
of the concept.
172. It should be recalled that in this context "wrongful" includes not only what is illegal
in a well-defined sense, but also includes abuse of legal process or even can include conduct
that is morally reprehensible or that violates other public norms. See supra note 80 and
accompanying text. "Under the modern view, acts or threats cannot constitute duress unless
they are wrongful; but a threat may be wrongful [in a "moral or equitable sense"] even though
the act threatened is lawful." Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 57 N.J. Super 278, 287, 154 A.2d 625,
630 (1959). "The act or threat upon which a claim of coercion is predicated must only be
wrongful in a moral sense, not necessarily a legal one." Gerber v. First Nat'l Bank, 30 11.
App. 3d 776, 332 N.E.2d 615 (1975). "It is clear that such act need not be criminal, tortious,
or in breach of contract in order to be wrongful...." 25 AM. Jui. 2D Duress and Undue
Influence § 7 (1966); see Norris v. Stewart, 350 So.2d 31, 31 (D. Ct. App. 1977) ("The act...is
unlawful or wrongful"); Louisville Title Ins. Co. v. Surety Title & Guar. Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d
781, 805, 132 Cal. Rptr. 63, 80 (1976) ("wrongful act or of bad faith"); Bridges v. Howell,
122 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) ("to amount to undue influence it must be
equivalent to moral coercion"). Not infrequently the term "improper" is used in connection
with the coercive threat. See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543, 549 (1897); Head
v. Gadsden Civil Service Bd., 389 So.2d 516, 519 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Miles v. Caples, 362
Mass. 107, -, 284 N.E.2d 231, 235 (1972) ("deception or improper influence"); see also,
e.g., Yinger v. Secord, 369 Mich. 364, -, 119 N.W.2d 577, 580 (1963) (judge reminding
jury of duty to stick by their personal convictions at late hour when fatigue had set in made
verdict a coerced one). Moreover the wrong may be an inducement rather than a threat. See
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (reference to "promises"); Wilson v. United States,
162 U.S. 613, 622 (1896) (references to "encouragement" of "favor"). In labor relations, a
favor to employees may be coercive. See, e.g., Adams v. Federal Express Corp., 470 F. Supp.
1356 (W.D. Tenn. 1979) (holding that coercion, within the meaning of Railway Labor Act,
exists where conduct favorable to employees is expressly designed to infringe on their freedom
of choice for or against unionization, and is reasonably calculated to have that effect), aff'd,
664 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1981). For examples of "wrong" in terms of violation of accepted
business practices, see Young v. Hoagland, 212 Cal. 426, 431, 298 P. 996, 998 (1931) (test is
whether reasonably prudent person would pay under threat what is not owed in course of
business transactions); Mitchell v. C. C. Sanitation Co., 430 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968). In connection with undue influence in the making of wills, questions of the amount and
kind of persuasiveness used, in relation to the relationship of trust or confidence that exists,
can be crucial. Such issues are determinable by reference to a variety of domestic and legal
norms as applicable to the particular circumstances. See infra text accompanying notes 176-86.
In cases of adoption, the threat necessary to establish coercion is "determined in the context of
public policy favoring finality in the adoption process." Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 42 Ill.
App. 3d 39, 43, 355 N.E.2d 361, 365 (1976), aff'd, 68 Ill. 2d 419, 12 Ill. Dec. 151, 369 N.E.2d
858, appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 963 (1978).
173. See supra note 115.
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However the word "because" cannot signify merely a causal link of any
kind. Plainly its causal significance here is more specific than that. The cause
that makes the difference must be the wrong that serves as and is intended
to serve as the Victim's reason for the act. Thus, in Victimization there is a
certain "meeting of minds."' 74 By intentionally providing the Victim with a
crucial reason for action, the Victimizer may be said to cause the Victim-act
but to do so specifically by acting upon and through the Victim's will. 75 In
most cases the Victim then does act as intended. Thus the essence of
Victimization may be expressed idiomatically: It is not merely working one's
will upon another, but wrongfully working one's will through the will of the
other.
We have no neat and objective test for determining a person's crucial
reason for doing an act. However, there is nothing perniciously subjective
here. It is no more (or less) subjective than determining a person's intent or
knowledge. We infer these from objective circumstances and evidence, and
we are more or less confident about our inference depending on the character
of that evidence. It is at bottom no different in law from the procedure by
which we gather another person's intent in everyday life. We rely on such
determinations in the most trivial as well as the most portentous of our
decisions.
D. Some Extensions of the Victimization Excuse: "Undue Influence"
The claim of undue influence has close affinities to coercion or duress:
It has been said that "at least the two would seem to run together,' ' 76 or
even that undue influence is simply a species of duress. 177 Certainly the
definitions and explanations of undue influence do reflect the familiar idiom
and imagery of the classic coercion tests, most especially in the assertions to
the effect that undue influence "must subvert and overthrow the will," and
that it entails the "destruction of free agency and will power. ' ' 78
174. See supra text following note 171 (definition under heading "To Wrong the Victim").
175. The Victim's act is "in truth the act of the one who procures the result..."-i.e., the
Victimizer. In re Estate of Loftin, 285 N.C. 717, 722, 208 S.E.2d 670, 674 (1974); see W.
LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 1, at 380 (suggesting something of the same sort). By contrast,
rather than seeing the Victimizer as acting through the will and reason of the Victim, Fletcher
argues that an excuse such as duress must be understood in terms of "mere react[ion]" and
"pressure." See G. FLarcHER, supra note 9(f), at 804, 811. In a later essay, Fletcher speaks in
terms of "an unreflecting reaction, a will that is overborne." See Fletcher, supra note 162, at
136-37.
176. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Duress and Undue Influence § 35, at 395 (1966).
177. Id.; see In re Estate of Loftin, 205 N.C. 717, 722, 208 S.E.2d 670, 674 (1974)
("Duress...may be described as the extreme of undue influence"); Commercial Nat'l Bank v.
Wheelock, 52 Ohio St. 534, -, 40 N.E. 636, 638 (1895) ("Duress is but the extreme of
undue influence").
178. Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963); see, e.g., Atlantic First Nat'l
Bank v. Cripe, 389 So.2d 224, 226 (Fla. App. 1980) (undue influence amounts to overpersuasion,
duress, force, coercion, or artful or fraudulent contrivances to such degree that there is
destruction of free agency and will power), modified, 422 So.2d 820 (1982); De Grassi v. De
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What is required if undue influence is to be subsumable under Victimi-
zation is that it is established, under appropriate criteria that the victim, in
deciding to do the act rather than not, decided so because the act was
intentionally made to appear reasonable by the Victimizer's wrongful con-
duct. These conditions are implicit in the concept of undue influence. One
sees this when one looks for the practical benchmarks of a "destroyed free
agency."
One finds immediately, as in the case of coercion, that although much
verbal reference is made to the "state of mind" of the victim, 79 the specific
analyses of facts and law in the cases resolve substantively into two basic
questions: Was there "overpersuasion," "excessive" argument, unfair tac-
tics, or coercion?8 0 It seems reasonable to subsume these questions under
the generic Victimization questions. First, was there some conduct wrongful
in the context, designed to influence the victim?' 8 ' In this context, such an
influence may be wrongful of its own nature, or by reason of some context-
specific relationship of trust or responsibility in which the influencer stands
to the victim. Second, did the wrongful conduct make the act appear
Grassi, 533 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) ("persuasion, entreaty, importunity, argument,
intercession, and solicitation must subvert and overthrow the will..."); see also In re Estate of
Bailey, 122 So.2d 243, 246 (Fla. App. 1960); Klussman v. Day, 107 Or. 109, 111, 213 P. 787,
789 (1923); In re Estate of Gold, 408 Pa. 41, -, 182 A.2d 707, 713 (1962); Long v. Long,
98 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), rev'd, 133 Tex. 96, 125 S.W.2d 1034 (1939).
179. See, e.g., In re Weeks Estate, 29 N.J. Super 533, 542, 103 A.2d 43, 48 (1954) ("The
clarifying test of the matter.. .is whether the testator's mind, when he made the will, was such
that..."); Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963) (inquiry necessarily turns to
state of mind); Long v. Long, 98 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (must act directly on
her mind), rev'd, 133 Tex. 96, 125 S.W.2d 1034 (1939).
180. See Stetzel v. Dickenson, 174 N.W.2d 438, 443 (Iowa 1970) (improper or wrongful
constraint, machination, or urgency of persuasion); Cockrum v. Cockrum, 550 S.W.2d 202,
207 (Mo. App. 1977) (force, coercion, or overpersuasion). See also supra note 178 (cases cited).
181. Not only does much of the language already quoted make this plain, but the
wrongfulness of the influence as essential to undue influence is also explicitly mentioned as such
in several cases. See, e.g., Boland v. Aycock, 191 Ga. 327, 329, 12 S.E.2d 319, 321 (1940)("honest
persuasion and argument, even to the point of importunity, is not undue influence..."; tears,
persuasion, strong language, with testatrix weak in mind, feeble in health, who yields in order
to escape mental distress and achieve peace and quiet is not undue influence where there is no
falsehood or fraudulent misrepresentations, or deceiving or misleading); Hyde v. Lewis, 25 Ill.
App. 3d 495, 501, 323 N.E.2d 533, 537 (1975); Eslick v. Montgomery, 3 Ill. App. 3d 447,
- 278 N.E.2d 412, 416 (1972); Jones v. Jones, 276 Or. 1125, -, 557 P.2d 239, 241
(1976); Long v. Long, 98 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) ("it must amount to moral
coercion"), rev'd, 133 Tex. 96, 125 S.W.2d 1034 (1939). Many times explicit reference to the
wrongfulness of the influence is absent, but on the other hand reference to the overpowering
or subverting of "free will" or "free agency" is included as essential and distinctive. We have
seen in previous discussions that this idiom is not, so far as its legal force goes, essentially a
reference to some traumatic mental breakdown, but is an indirect way of alluding to the
wrongfulness of the externally created condition that made the decision appear reasonable.
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reasonable,8 2 thereby eliciting the Victim's act? 8 3 In answering the latter
question the court will of course take into account old-age, weakness or
other "mental" factors, if they might relevantly bear on the victim's assess-
ment of reasonableness. 1
8 4
That the central issue, even where "weakness of mind" is relevant, is
the act of wrongfully making something appear reasonable, and not the
182. See supra note 175 (question is implicit in the language quoted). On one hand, we
have to recognize that the concept of undue influence, as distinguished from incompetency,
implies an influence exerted on someone who is mentally competent for the purpose at hand.
See infra note 186. The victim must be rational with regard to the material facts and issues,
and able to reason about them at least at some minimally satisfactory level. On the other hand,
we see that the undue influence takes advantage of this very capacity, creating what appears to
be reasons for acting in a certain way, and doing so by means of some form of wrongful
persuasion, argument, threat, or plea, or else in the form of some deceit, trickery, fraud, or
"machination." Of course undue influence may include conduct that, for example, wears down
(by importuning, tears, persistent discussion) a person already physically and mentally vulner-
able. This may affect what will then appear reasonable to that person. For example, acquiescence
to certain improper advice or argument may appear reasonable to one who is exhausted, but
not to one who is strong enough to withstand improper importuning.
As has been said in many undue influence cases, the importuning tactics do not of
themselves suffice to constitute undue influence; to make them "undue," there must be some
element of threat, fraud, deceit, misleading, misrepresentation-in short, presentation in a
wrongful way of a reason for the weak and beset victim to make the decision the influencer
desires. Here again the pseudo-psychological language of "pressures" on the will, "controlling"
the will, "subverting" or "overcoming" the will, often does duty, misleadingly, for the concept
of providing a rational person with what appears to be reason for doing what the influencer
desires. See In re Estate of Weir, 475 F.2d 988, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (influence gained by
kindness and affection not undue unless imposition or fraud practiced, e.g., nurse, by false
representations refusing relatives admission to see well patient; threats of physical abuse while
under sedation to compel executing will); Boland v. Aycock, 191 Ga. 327, 329, 12 S.E.2d 319,
321 (1940); Adoption of Jones, 558 P.2d 422, 424 (Okla. App. 1976) (influence of affection,
confidence, gratitude not undue, but is so if it confuses judgment or is coercive or controlling);
Methodist Mission Home of Texas v. N-A-B-, 451 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)
(persuasion and offering reasons not undue influence, but is so if it includes misleading victim).
183. See Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963) (undue influence requires
proof of: "(1) the existence and exertion of an influence; (2) the effective operation of such
influence so as to subvert or overpower the mind of the testator at the time of the execution of
the testament; (3) the execution of a testament which the maker thereof would not have executed
but for such evidence").
184. We have here the same issue of the intertwining of subjective and objective consid-
erations in determining what was made to appear reasonable. See supra text accompanying note
76; see also Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963) (the issue necessarily turns
the inquiry to the victim's state of mind, mental or physical incapacity to resist or susceptibility).
But see In re Estate of Dunson, 141 So.2d 601, 604 (Fla. App. 1962) (mere old age,
frailty; sickness, failing memory, or vacillating judgment not inconsistent with testamentary
capacity and absence of undue influence in spite of affection, kindness, attachment as influ-
ences); Boland v. Aycock, 191 Ga. 327, 12 S.E.2d 319 (1940) (elaborate hypothetical and real
importunities of family directed to person of weak mind and feeble health not undue influence
if testatrix not misled); Miles v. Caples, 362 Mass. 107, -, 284 N.E.2d 231, 235 (1972)
(donor of gift disoriented before transfer, which in itself only shows susceptibility but not
submission).
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"overcoming" or "destruction" of some part of the mind, can be readily
seen.18 1 Imagine a case in which an argument or piece of advice that was in
every respect true, wise, and lawful, and that was persuasively presented;
imagine this "overcame" the weak-minded advisee's prior false opinions and
unwise resolutions. Would this "overcoming" of the will be a "destruction
of free agency" or a "subversion of free will"? Plainly not. It would be
legally unobjectionable. Thus, it is not a matter of mental power, forceful-
ness, or weakness that is at issue, or of mere forcefulness versus weakness
of mind. It is the use of wrongful means to persuade in a situation where,
absent such means, there would have been no such decision that is at issue.
The point becomes even more clearly evident when one is careful to distin-
guish the case of wrongful persuasion of a mentally competent person (undue
influence) from the case of tactics that truly overcome a person by rendering
that person mentally incompetent. In the latter case, there is no longer undue
influence but legal non-competence, raising very different legal questions.
8 6
185. Undue influence has been classified by some courts as a species of fraud. See Noel v.
Noel, 229 Ala. 20, -, 155 So. 362, 363 (1934) (undue influence is species of constructive
fraud but not fraud proper); In re Shell's Estate, 28 Colo. 167, -, 63 P. 413, 413
(1900)("strictly speaking, 'fraud' and 'undue influence' are not synonymous expressions. Undue
influence is, in one sense, a species of fraud... [but] may exist without any positive fraud being
shown"); In re Estate of Loftin, 285 N.C. 317, 722, 208 S.E.2d 670, 674 (1974) ("undue
influence is a fraudulent influence over the mind"). But see Alexander v. Gibson, 176 Ala. 258,
- 57 So. 760, 871 (1912) (to show undue influence complainant must show both undue
influence over mind and that execution of will was procured by fraud or result of fraud); Matter
of Adoption of Male Minor Child, 1 Hawaii App. 364, -, 619 P.2d 1092, 1097 (1980)
(undue influence is distinct from fraud).
As noted earlier, duress has been thought of as a species of undue influence. See supra
note 177. See also Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc., 42 Ill. App. 3d 39, 43, 355 N.E.2d 361, 364
(1976) ("duress or undue influence"--apparently being used without concern to differentiate
sharply), aff'd, 68 Ill. 2d 419, 12 Ill. Dec. 151, 369 N.E.2d 858, appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 963
(1978). Furthermore, duress itself is occasionally characterized as a species of fraud. See Leeper
v. Beltrami, 53 Cal.2d 195, 204, 347 P.2d 12, 19, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12, 19 (1959) ("Duress is a
species of fraud") (quoting Tanforan v. Tanforan, 173 Cal. 270, 275, 159 P. 709, 712 (1916));
Williams v. Rentz Banking Co., 112 Ga. App. 384, 385, 145 S.E.2d 256, 258 (1965) ("Duress
is considered as a species of fraud...") (quoting King v. Lewis, 188 Ga. 594, 597, 4 S.E.2d 464,
467 (1939)). Contrariwise, and from a purely logical standpoint, a plausible case can be made
for viewing fraud as a species of undue influence rather than vice versa; and on the same logical
basis coercion would appear to be a species of undue influence. See In re Estate of Loftin, 285
N.C. 717, 722, 208 S.E.2d 670, 674 (1974) (duress may be described as the extreme of undue
influence); Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Wheelock, 52 Ohio St. 534, -, 40 N.E. 636, 638
(1895) (same).
The conceptual interrelations among "fraud," "duress," and "undue influence" are, to
put it mildly, obscure. "It is sometimes said that 'undue influence' is a subtle something that
defies definition." Boland v. Aycock, 191 Ga. 327, 329, 12 S.E.2d 319, 321 (1940). "The term
'undue influence' is not very clearly defined by the courts." 25 AM. JuR. 2D Duress and Undue
Influence § 35, at 395 (1966). Nevertheless, the essential element of wrongfulness in each is
clearly brought out in the concept of Victimization, which, as can be readily seen, can have
application in types of fraud as well as duress and undue influence. See infra note 191 (fuller
comment on the possible broader applications of Victimization concept).
186. "Undue influence in the procurement of a testament is a ground ... separate and distinct
from the ground of testamentary incapacity; [u]ndue influence implies the existence of a
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IV. WHY SHOULD VICTIMIZATION BE A GROUND OF EXCUSE OR
AVOmANCE?
The literature that bears on the justification for Victimization claims has
been often formulated in the context of coercion as an excuse for criminal
acts.'1 This, as the preceding analyses imply, is a limited and, therefore,
misleading perspective.' 88
testamentary capacity...." Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963) (emphasis
added); see McFadin v. Catron, 120 Mo. 252, -, 25 S.W. 506, 509 (1894) ("want of
testamentary capacity, or...fear or undue influence"); Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Wheelock, 52
Ohio St. 534, -, 40 N.E. 636, 637 (1895) (if undue influence exists, then capacity exists).
See also Alexander v. Gibson, 176 AIa. 258, -, 57 So. 760, 761 (1912) (treating testamentary
incapacity and undue influence as distinct grounds for contesting will); In re Estate of Bailey,
122 So.2d 243, 245, 246 (Fla. App. 1960) (court defines undue influence and lack of capacity
in different ways); Long v. Long, 98 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (distinguishing
explicitly between issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence), rev'd, 133 Tex. 96, 125
S.W.2d 1034 (1939).
187. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 162; Intolerable Conditions, supra note 162; Prison
Escape, supra note 162; Duress and the Prison Escape, supra note 162; Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d
678 (1976). See also, e.g., Cross, supra note 21 (coercion as a criminal law defense); Dennis,
supra note 19 (same); Edwards (1951), supra note I (same); Edwards (1953), supra note 1
(same); Fletcher, supra note 9(f) (same); Hall, supra note 1 (same); O'Regan, supra note 12
(same); Smith, supra note 12 (same); Wasik, supra note 21 (same). See generally United States
v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (lengthy review of literature).
188. The justifications offered by legal scholars and jurists have been quite various. All
differ from the justification offered in the text following this note. The following very brief,
representative review will suffice to suggest the range of proposals.
It has been argued that compassion is the basis for the excuse-the Victim did what I
would have done too (or what any of us would have done). See G. FLETCHER, supra note 9(f),
at § 10.3.3; REPORT ON DEFENCES, supra note 9(a), at 10 ("the defence of duress is essentially
a concession to human weakness"). Whether what is intended here is a sentiment or a moral
principle is not entirely clear. See Fingarette, supra note 20, at 1009-10 (discussion of Fletcher's
view). It has been held that the law should excuse the victim of coercion because it is
pragmatically unrealistic to expect more than what a person of ordinary courage and firmness
would do. G. WLLAMS, supra note 1, at 580; see REPORT ON DEFENCES, supra note 9(a), at 7.
Or such an expectation has been called unfair or unjust. See D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v.
Lynch, [1975] A.C. 653; G. FLETCHER, supra note 9(f), at 804 ("cannot fairly be punished");
Cross, supra note 21 at 372; REPORT ON DEFENCES, supra note 9(a), at 7. A moral justification
in terms of unfairness has also been proposed on the basis of supposing that the victim's power
of choice is gone, and that refusal to excuse the victim would amount to the obviously unfair
demand that a person make a certain choice even though that person has no power to make it.
The Model Penal Code, § 2.09(1), seems to imply this when it defines the defense of duress in
terms of a threat that "a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable
to resist." Fletcher takes a position that, at least verbally, casts his theory of excuse in such
terms as: "circumstances that overwhelm...capacity for choice," "distort the actor's capacity
for choice" or that "the actor's freedom of choice is constricted." See G. FLETCHER, supra
note 9(f), at 801-02. But then Fletcher translates this into what he calls "moral involuntariness,"
which in turn becomes "a matter of moral judgment about what we expect people to resist...."
See id. at 803-04. But the ambiguity in all this lies in the question as to whether the "moral
involuntariness" is determined on the basis of a prior moral judgment about the fairness and
justice of punishing, or whether that moral judgment is itself grounded on a prior judgment as
to whether choice is "constricted" or "distorted." This ambiguity is left unresolved when he
subsequently proposes that we "rest the entire theory of excuses on the injustice of punishing
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The present approach differs from those to be found in the literature in
its more comprehensive approach, and in the substantive analyses that result
in bringing out a justification purely on the basis of legal principle. In
offering such a "legalist" analysis and justification there is no intent to deny
what is obviously true, that excuse or avoidance grounded on Victimization
may often also be justifiable on the basis of morality, or public policy, or
other extra-legal considerations. The point, rather, is that one finds strictly
within the context of law considerations adequate to explain and justify
treating Victimization as an excuse or avoidance claim, and so one does not
need to rely on controversial public policy, moral, or other extra-legal
assumptions in order to proceed rationally with such excuse or avoidance
claims. It is arguable that the enduring appeal of the various Victimization
excuses, in spite of changing moral, political, and psychological views over
the centuries, may arise from an intuitive awareness of the always present
solid foundation for such claims in the very idea of law itself.
Basic to the simple justification to be presented now is the conception
of Victimization as implying confession of the act as legally defined, and as
embodying a plea to be excused from, or to avoid, certain ordinary legal
consequences of that act on the ground of further, special conditions. s9 Thus
unavoidable violations of the law." Id. at 805-06. Frankfurt's position plainly embodies, as
being central to coercion, the incapacity to exercise choice. See supra text accompanying note
32; supra note 25; see also Gallaher Drug Co. v. Robinson, 13 Ohio Misc. 216, 232 N.E.2d 668
(1965) ("irresistibly driven"); Gardner, supra note 9(0, at 133 (choice impossible). This doctrine
seems to be related to the conception of the Victim-act as being "in truth the act of the one
who procures the result," i.e., the Victimizer. See In re Estate of Loftin, 285 N.C. 717, 722,
208 S.E.2d 670, 674 (1974); Gorringe v. Reed, 23 Utah 120, -, 63 P. 902, 905 (1901); see
also W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, supra note 1, at 380 (suggesting similar notion).
The power of choice has also played a central role in justifications based on certain theories
of what a good system of law would be. It has been held, for example, that in a good system
of law, if the law acts to punish or constrain me in some way, this should be the predictable
result of the course I have chosen, not the result of factors I do not control by my choices, as
is purportedly the case in duress. See H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, and
Negligence, Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY, 41-53,
143-44 (1968); H. MORRIS, Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 46-49 (1976).
Utilitarian argument in terms of the relative evils of the alternatives have been used to justify
duress excuses as forms of Necessity. The utilitarian argument itself is based, of course, on
Bentham's work, although Bentham does not seem to have taken up the topic of duress and
the justification of its excusing role. See J. BENTnAm, AN INTRODUCTION To THE PRINCIPLES
OF MORALS & LEGISLATION (1970). See also Cross, supra note 21, at 374 (giving a utilitarian-
Necessity account).
All these proposals are based in some essential respect on considerations external to the
system of the law itself. That is, they are justifications based on human sentiment, moral
principle, social policy, psychological assumptions, or evaluative theories about the worth of
different possible systems of law.
189. See Fingarette, supra note 20. The author, in that essay, argued for the position
adopted herein in regard to the matters specifically mentioned in the text immediately above.
On the other hand, that essay concluded with the hypothesis that the "further conditions"
warranting excuse would always be appropriately characterizable in terms of impaired capacity
for self-government-a hypothesis inconsistent with the position argued for in the present essay.
It is now my view that it was a mistake to take mental disability-Le., impaired psychological
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VICTIMIZATION
Victimization is in the nature of an affirmative defense.' 90 And its range of
applicability is very wide.
We are now prepared to ask and answer the question: Given that all the
constitutive elements of the act as legally defined are present, why should a
Victim be relieved of the burdens legally normally entailed? The legalist
answer is quite simple and direct: It is true by definition that where there is
Victimization there is, in the eyes of the law, on one side a wronged party
who is acting reasonably under the circumstance. It is of the very essence of
law-it is the raison d'etre of the law-to protect and defend those who are
innocent and who act reasonably and to oppose and discourage those who
do wrong. But then to burden the Victim with punishment, obligations, or
losses normally incident on the Victim's act would be to act directly contrary
to what the law ultimately stands for. It would be to burden the innocent
victim, and often would amount to aiding or at least standing neutral before
the wrongdoer.
Thus, even where a legally defined act has been committed, it makes
sense, as a basic policy of law, that the imposition of legal burdens normally
consequent on the act should be modified, if there is Victimization, so that
the law will not in effect knowingly be an accomplice to wrong and knowingly
be unconcerned to protect the vulnerable and reasonable innocent. This
essentially simple and intuitively apt rationale emerges out of the Victimiza-
tion concept as defined in essentially legal terms, and its force applies very
generally to the traditional forms of legal claims under rubrics such as duress
and undue influence.' 9'
capacity-as providing the paradigm of excuses generally. The argument herein in regard to
Victimization does have a place for a "flaw" in the deliberative process. The emphasis, however,
is on the fact that the flaw, far from being a psychological one, is a flaw constituted by the
wrongfulness of a second party's act. Psychologically speaking, the emphasis here is on the
Victim's psychological capacity for rational choice. The two positions are not strictly contradic-
tory, but the former one was substantively misleading with its suggestion that the flawed choice
situation should be read psychologically. The present one (it is to be hoped) stresses the
perspective that is substantively fundamental.
190. It can of course be argued that the concept of coercion could, logically speaking, be
incorporated into the definition of the criminal act by making "absence of coercion" defini-
tionally an element of each crime, thus making a defense of coercion amount to a denial of the
act. Aside from any procedural consequences that might tend to follow, e.g., with regard to
burden of proof matters, such verbal manipulations would obscure the substance of the matter.
There is good reason-more than verbal economy-why the law has not in general defined legal
acts in this way. Pleas of avoidance or excuse based on coercion (or, for example, insanity, or
official misconduct) have a distinctive generality of applicability; they apply more or less
wholesale to wide ranges of legal acts, even to all acts In this generality, these pleas differ
significantly from defenses based on absence of some element traditionally playing a specific
constitutive role in distinguishing one specific act from other closely related ones, as elements
of intent or knowledge quite typically do. Thus, intent to retain possession distinguishes the
category "theft" from the category "trespass." On the other hand, "coercion" does not
distinguish one category of crime from another, but rather distinguishes one instance of a
specific category of crime, for example, theft, from typical instances of that same category.
191. No attempt is made in this paper to develop the ways in which the concept of
Victimization also operates in areas of law where such notions as fraud, misrepresentation, and
unconscionability are central. The reasons are several: (1) Each concept covers a wide and
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complex range of circumstances, and many variant definitions; discussion, therefore, would
demand more space than can appropriately be afforded here, and would also demand more
thoroughgoing analysis than this author has yet been able to complete; and (2) specifically, it
is plausible that, unlike undue influence, not all forms of unconscionableness, fraud, and
misrepresentation amount to Victimization. To settle this question, and to determine whether
in the end all versions of these types of excuse/avoidance concepts do imply Victimization,
would take extensive analysis which, as has been said, is beyond the scope of this paper. On
the other hand, since it is relatively plain that undue influence is a form of Victimization, it
has been possible to treat that topic here with comparative brevity. Moreover the treatment of
deception in the text, as developed in connection with the material on coerced confessions,
shows that some deception, at least, does amount to Victimization. That discussion exhibits a
pattern of Victimizing-deception that can easily be generalized to include forms of deception
and other Victimizing wrongdoing in contexts where the notion of coercion does not at all come
into play.
The Victimization concept also plays a role in certain types of antitrust cases because in
that area the concept of "unreasonable restraint," when used in connection with an unwilling
victim, is so to speak a cousin of duress. Such cases both embody an improper use of power,
are contrary to legal policy, elicit conduct by innocent parties that would otherwise not appear
reasonable, and, therefore, negate what would otherwise be valid legal relationships. More
specifically, "unreasonable restraint" in antitrust law is said to connote the improper use of
"market power," the impropriety being rooted in an anti-competitive role played by the market
power in question. See, e.g., P. AREaDA, ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS (1974). However, the rationales
for the concept of duress and unreasonable restraint differ significantly: Duress is in its very
essence a Victimization concept, that is a concept essentially directed to protection of a wronged
victim, whereas unreasonable restraint of trade is most fundamentally a concept directed to
promoting economic competition, a public economic policy goal assumed to be beneficial on
the whole for society. The "unreasonable restraint" prohibition is only secondarily and, in
some but not all instances, directed to protection or redress for a particular wronged private
party. Thus, characteristic elements of duress, the victim's initial innocence, continuing unwill-
ingness, and lack of available escape or legal recourse, are not always present, and in any case








CHARLES A. BLANCHARD SETH CALVEN PRAGER
Business Editor Research Editor




JEFFREY J. GrGUERE MARY MADIGAN
THOMAS CHRISTOPHER HAVENS DOUGLAS G. STANFORD
Note and Comment Editors
KEVIN J. BUCKLEY PETER BRANDON LEWIS
RICHARD B. EARLS JoHN T. MURRAY
JERRY EDWARD FARMER ALBERT FRANK SEBOK
BRUCE MICHAEL HATRAK S. PERRY THOMAS, JR.
STUART ROBIN KAPLAN PETER G. ZEMANiAN
Staff
R. TAYLOR ABBOT, JR. ROBERT B. MCINTOSH
DANA JAMES BOLTON BARBARA L. MoRIus
KnTH B. BROOKS KAREN PUHALA
BARBARA OLSON BRUCKMANN JOHN L. RADDER
STOKELY G. CALDWELL, JR. W. WHITAKER RAYNER
STEPHEN DAVID DELLETT MICHAEL H. RE"
M. LEE DOANE ROBERT C. RICE
PAUL GRIFFITHS FRANCIS D. SHAFFER
PHILIP L. HANRAHAN DANIEL P. SHAVER
BRIAN G. HOWLAND PATRICIA A. SHEAN
ROBERT WALKER HuMPHRIEs STEPHEN STOCKTON
H. FRASIER IVES LYNN K. SUTER
GARY B. KLINE BARBARA J. TAYLOR
JAMES R. LANCE PETER J. WALSH, JR.
K. NICHOLAS MARTrrscH PAUL STEPHEN WARE




JOHN D. WILSON, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., President of the University
FREDERIC L. KIRGis, JR., B.A., LL.B., Dean and Professor of Law
CHARLES VAILL LAUGHLIN, A.B., LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D., Professor Emeritus
EDWARD 0. HENNEMAN, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean and Assistant Professor of Law
MARY PATRICIA WALTHER, B.A., J.D., Assistant Dean
ROGER D. GROOT, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
LEwIs H. LARuE, A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law
ANDREW W. McTHENIA, JR., A.B., M.A., LL.B., Professor of Law
JAMES M. PHEMISTER, B.S., J.D., Professor of Law
J. TIMOTHY PILIPPS, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
WILFRED J. RITz, A.B., LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D., Professor of Law
THOMAS L. SHAFFER, B.A., J.D., LL.D., Professor of Law and Director of the Frances
Lewis Law Center
RoY L. STEINHEIMER, JR., A.B., J.D., Professor of Law
JAMES W. H. STEWART, B.S., LL.B., LL.M., Professor of Law
JOSEPH E. ULRICH, A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law
DENIS J. BRION, B.S., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
SAMUEL W. CALHOUN, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
MARK H. GRUNEWALD, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
WaLIAM S. GERMER, B.S., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
ATHORNIA STEELE, B.A., J.D., Visiting Associate Professor of Law
SARAH K. WIANT, B.A., M.L.S., J.D., Law Librarian and Associate Professor of Law
STEVEN H. HOBBS, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
ToNI M. MASSARO, B.S., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
BRmaN C. MURCHISON, B.S., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
JOAN M. SHAUGHNESSY, B.A., J.D., Assistant Professor of Law
RULDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III, A.B., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law
ROBERT M. CAMPBELL, A.B., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law
JAY D. COOK, JR., A.B., M.B.A., Ph.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
VIRGINIA B. GARRISON, B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
EDWARD S. GRAVES, A.B., M.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
LAWRENCE H. HOOVER, JR., B.A., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
J. STEPHEN LAWRENCE, JR., A.B., J.D., Adjunct Professor of Law
GEORGE R. ST. JOHN, B.A., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law
MICHAEL K. SMELTZER, B.A., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law
WILLIAM W. SWEENEY, A.B., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law
ROBERT C. WOOD, III, B.A., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law
HENRY L. WOODWARD, A.B., LL.B., Adjunct Professor of Law
ROGER C. CRAMTON, A.B., J.D., Frances Lewis Scholar 1984
